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Abstract 
 
Detention is a necessary part of armed conflict, and is thus permitted by international 
humanitarian law in conflicts of an international character. However, detention also raises 
human rights concerns and is limited by human rights instruments, like the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The recent case of Hassan v United Kingdom constitutes 
the European Court of Human Rights’ first substantive discussion of the relationship and 
conflict between these two areas of law. The Court concluded that, as the United Kingdom 
was acting in accordance with international humanitarian law, its actions were not a 
breach of the European Convention, even though the Convention does not permit 
internment in armed conflict. In Serdar Mohammed v Minister of Defence the United 
Kingdom Court of Appeal continued the discussion of detention in armed conflict and in 
doing so reached the conclusion that there is no international humanitarian law authority 
to detain in conflicts of a non-international character. This paper examines the issues 
raised by those two cases. It highlights problems with the reasoning in Hassan and suggests 
a logical alternative: derogation from the European Convention. The paper also analyses 
the decision in Mohammed, and concludes that while the finding is concerning, it is likely 
to change in future due to customary law developments. 
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I Introduction 
 
Detention is a necessary reality of armed conflict, despite the negative connotations it has 
been linked to, particularly in recent years. Internment (detention for reasons of preventive 
security where no charges are brought against the person detained)1 is a logical alternative 
to killing, as a means of ensuring security and removing members of enemy forces from 
the battlefield.2 Consequently, detention of this type is something states wish to undertake, 
and is permitted (to some extent) by international humanitarian law (IHL) in international 
armed conflict (IAC). However, there is an obvious clash between the need to detain, and 
the human rights concerns associated with detention – reflected in the fact that many 
international human rights law (IHRL) instruments protect individuals from deprivation of 
liberty. The recent cases of Hassan v United Kingdom (Hassan)3 and Serdar Mohammed 
& Ors v Ministry of Defence (Mohammed)4 have brought the issue of detention in armed 
conflict to the fore in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
art 5 of which guarantees liberty and security of the person and limits the situations in 
which a person can be detained.5 
 
In Hassan, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that 
the detention of an Iraqi national by British forces was not a breach of art 5, because the 
section is to be interpreted in accordance with IHL ( namely the Geneva Conventions), 
which permits detention in IAC. More recently, in Mohammed, the United Kingdom Court 
of Appeal held that the detention of an Afghan national by British forces was a breach of 
art 5, because IHL does not provide power to detain in non-international armed conflict 
  
1 Also referred to as administrative detention; Els Debuf Captured in War: Lawful Internment in Armed 
Conflict (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2013) at 6; and Ashley S Deeks “Administrative Detention in Armed 
Conflict” (2009) 40 Case W Res J Intl Law 403 at 404.  
2 Debuf, above n 1, at 228; and Bruce ‘Ossie’ Oswald “Some Controversies of Detention in Multinational 
Operations and the Contributions of the Copenhagen Principles” (2013) 95 IRRC 707 at 708. 
3 Hassan v United Kingdom (29750/09) Grand Chamber, ECHR 16 September 2014. 
4 Serdar Mohammed v Minister of Defence [2015] EWCA Civ 843. 
5 See appendix; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ETS 
5 (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) [ECHR], art 5.  
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(NIAC). This paper will examine these cases and the issues they raise, with the aim of 
evaluating both the current legal position, and likely future developments.  
 
Two main issues arise from these decisions. First, in Hassan, the Court reached its 
conclusion by interpreting art 5 in accordance with IHL pertaining to IAC, which provides 
authority to detain in armed conflict. However, art 5 provides an exhaustive list of grounds 
upon which someone can be detained, which does not include internment in armed conflict. 
This result is problematic and has been the subject of much criticism. The seemingly logical 
alternative is requiring derogation under art 15 of the ECHR, which permits derogation 
from some ECHR obligations in times of emergency.6 However, whether this provision is 
operable in cases of extraterritorial armed conflict has not yet been fully explored by courts 
or in scholarship. This paper will examine whether a court may find a valid derogation 
regarding facts like those in Hassan and Mohammed. While doing so would be a change in 
ECHR jurisprudence, it would be preferable to the approach in Hassan.  
 
The second major issue is that the Court in Mohammed, when determining whether the 
reasoning from Hassan could apply, found that IHL does not provide authority to detain in 
NIAC,7 leading to its conclusion that the detention in Mohammed was illegal. This decision 
is significant, as it means that authority to detain in armed conflict must come from either 
domestic law, or United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). There are issues 
with relying on either source, making it pertinent for this paper to examine the likelihood 
of a future court reversing this ruling to find that there is authority to detain in NIAC. There 
is debate over whether treaties could provide this power, but change to the ruling in 
Mohammed is more likely to come from customary international law (CIL), stemming from 
soft law instruments. 
 
In order to explain and analyse the above issues, this paper will do the following: First, it 
will outline a number of aspects that form the background to these cases, starting with an 
  
6 See appendix.  
7 This paper will proceed on the basis that the classifications of conflict in Hassan and Mohammed were 
correct. 
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explanation of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the ECHR. The paper will then set out the 
facts and results of the Hassan and Mohammed cases, and explain the IHL rules of 
detention. Subsequently, a summary of the previous interaction between IHL and IHRL in 
the context of the ECHR will be provided. The reasoning from Hassan will then be 
examined in depth, in order to introduce the suggested alternative, derogation. With a view 
to determining whether derogation could be permissible in situations like Hassan and 
Mohammed, the case law around art 15 will be explained and then applied to the facts of 
both Hassan and Mohammed. It will be argued that valid derogations could have been 
entered regarding these cases, and that requiring derogation is preferable to the approach 
from Hassan.  
 
The second half of the paper will address the finding in Mohammed that there is no IHL 
authority to detain in NIAC. The reasoning from Mohammed will be explained, and the 
problems with its ruling outlined: relying on either domestic law or UNSCRs for authority 
to detain is impractical, and IHL is a preferable source. The final section of the paper will 
determine whether it is likely that the ruling from Mohammed will change. In particular it 
will scrutinise the Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines on the Handling of 
Detainees in International Military Operations (Copenhagen Principles) and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross Process on Strengthening International 
Humanitarian Law Protecting Persons Deprived of their Liberty (ICRC Process), which are 
likely to impact this area in future. 
 
This paper will demonstrate that, while numerous problems arise from these cases, they are 
problems which can and should be remedied in future. Resolution of these issues is 
important due to the integral part that detention plays in armed conflict. Further, this area 
of IHL is especially important in modern conflict, given the rise in NIAC, and the fact that 
extraterritorial intervention, and thus detention by foreign forces, is not uncommon. These 
issues are likely to remain topical; the United Kingdom Minister of Defence has indicated 
   
11 
 
that leave to appeal Mohammed to the Supreme Court will be sought,8 and the case may 
eventually reach the ECtHR.9 
 
II Background 
A Jurisdiction of the ECHR 
 
It has been accepted for some time that jurisdiction of the ECHR is not limited to the 
territories of contracting parties.10 Article 1 of the ECHR states that parties to the 
Convention shall secure the rights and freedoms in the Convention to “…everyone within 
their jurisdiction”.11 The case law interpreting art 1 has found jurisdiction applies 
extraterritorially if either spatial or personal control is involved.12 The strand of jurisdiction 
relevant to Hassan and Mohammed is personal jurisdiction, the applicability of which was 
recently solidified in the ECtHR judgments of Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom and 
Al-Jedda v United Kingdom.13 As Christian Tomuschat states, these cases confirm that 
“…parties to the ECHR remain bound by their contractual commitments wherever they 
act… provided that they may be deemed to have jurisdiction over a person”.14 The ruling 
in Al-Skeini was adopted by the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Smith v Ministry of 
Defence,15 making it applicable in United Kingdom law. Personal jurisdiction is especially 
  
8 Ministry of Defence (UK) “Breaking News: MOD Response to Court of Appeal Judgment” (30 July 2015) 
<www.modmedia.blog.gov.uk>; and Owen Bocott “British Forces Illegally Detained Afghan Suspect, Court 
of Appeal Rules” (30 July 2015) <www.theguardian.com>. 
9 Sean Aughey and Aurel Sari “Targeting and Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict: Serdar 
Mohammed and the Limits of Human Rights Convergence” (2015) 91 ILS 60 at 118.  
10 See DJ Harris and others Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) at 804; and Pieter van Dijk and others (eds) Theory and 
Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2006) at 462.   
11 ECHR, above n 5, art 1.  
12 See Loizidou v Turkey (1995) 20 EHRR 99 (1996) 21 EHRR 188 (ECHR) at [62]-[64].  
13 Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom (2011) 30 BHRC 561 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) at [134]-[137]; 
and Al-Jedda v United Kingdom (2011) 30 BHRC 637 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) at [75].  
14 Christian Tomuschat “The European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations” in Andreas Follesdal, 
Birgit Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds) Constituting Europe The European Court of Human Rights in a National, 
European and Global Context (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013) 334 at 366.  
15 Smith and Others v Ministry of Defence [2014] AC 52 at [46]–[50].  
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clear when a person is detained,16 meaning the detainees in Hassan and Mohammed fell 
within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom and could claim under the ECHR.  
 
The following parts will explain the facts of Hassan and Mohammed, to provide 
background to the subsequent discussion. Particular segments of the reasoning in each case, 
and the implications of said reasoning, will be discussed in more depth later in the paper.17 
B Hassan v United Kingdom 
 
Khadim Resaan Hassan (the applicant) brought a claim regarding the detention of his 
brother, Tarek Hassan (Hassan), in Iraq in 2003. On 23 April 2003, British forces went to 
Hassan’s home to arrest the applicant, as he was a member and manager of the Ba’ath 
political party.  Khadim was not there, but Hassan was on the roof of the house with an 
AK-47 machine gun, and was subsequently arrested.18 Hassan was taken to Camp Bucca, 
a detention facility. He was questioned twice, but eventually released into the ‘civilian pen’ 
when interviewers determined he had been “arrested as a result of mistaken identity”,19 and 
was “… of no intelligence value...”.20 The records of Hassan’s release from the Camp are 
varied, but he was most likely released in early May 2003.21 After his release, Hassan did 
not contact his family. On 1 September 2003, his family was informed that Hassan’s body 
had been found in Samara (North of Baghdad, far from Camp Bucca), with eight bullet 
wounds from an AK-47 in his chest.22 
 
The applicant brought a claim to the United Kingdom High Court, alleging breaches of his 
brother’s rights under arts 5 (the right to liberty and security),23 2 (the right to life), and 3 
  
16 Tomuschat, above n 14, at 366.  
17 See below at Part III and Part V. 
18 Hassan v United Kingdom, above n 3, at [10]– 11].  
19 At [24]. 
20 At [24]. 
21 At [55].  
22 At [29].  
23 See appendix. 
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(prohibition of torture) of the ECHR.24 These claims were rejected by the United Kingdom 
High Court,25 based on Walker J’s conclusion that Hassan was not within the United 
Kingdom’s jurisdiction under art 1 of the ECHR. Hassan was thus unable to proceed with 
his claim in the domestic system.26  A case was then brought before the Grand Chamber of 
the ECtHR. There, the applicant claimed there was a breach of art 5, as the detention and 
arrest were arbitrary, unlawful, and lacking in procedural safeguards. He also brought 
claims under arts 2, and 3, alleging that the United Kingdom had failed to carry out an 
investigation into the circumstances of the detention and death.27 The claims under arts 2 
and 3 were dealt with succinctly by the Court, which concluded there was no evidence that 
Hassan was ill-treated while detained, or that the United Kingdom had any involvement in 
his death.28 The United Kingdom was therefore not obligated to investigate either issue.29 
The Court’s discussion of art 5 was considerably more substantial. Following Al-Skeini,30 
the Court concluded that because “Tarek Hassan was within the physical power and control 
of the United Kingdom soldiers…”,31 he fell within United Kingdom jurisdiction from the 
moment of his arrest, until his release.32 Regarding art 5, the Court held that the detention 
of Hassan was not arbitrary or a breach of art 5, as it was consistent with the powers of the 
United Kingdom under IHL pertaining to IAC, and the requisite procedural safeguards 
were met.33 So, while the art 5 claims were admissible, the majority held there was no 
violation of the ECHR.34  
C Serdar Mohammed v Minister for Defence 
 
  
24 ECHR, above n 5, arts 2, 3, and 5.  
25 Hassan v United Kingdom [2009] EWHC 309 (Admin).  
26 Hassan v United Kingdom, above n 3, at [47].  
27 At [3].  
28 At [63]. 
29 At [63]-[64]. 
30 Al-Skeini and Others v United Kingdom, above n 13.  
31 At [76].  
32 At [80].  
33 At [110].  
34 At [111].  
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In contrast, the more recent case of Mohammed held that the United Kingdom, in a situation 
involving detention in NIAC rather than IAC, had violated art 5. The case concerned the 
detention of Afghan national Serdar Mohammed, by British forces acting in Afghanistan 
as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).35 Mohammed was arrested 
on 7 April 2010 by United Kingdom forces targeting a vehicle believed to be carrying a 
senior Taliban commander.36 Mohammed claimed to be a farmer, but intelligence was later 
received “to the effect that he was a senior Taliban Commander …”.37 He was initially 
detained on the basis that he was a threat to the accomplishment of the ISAF mission.38 
Following a review of the detention on 4 May 2010, the Afghan authorities indicated they 
wished to accept custody of Mohammed, but did not have the capacity to do so. From this 
point on he was under “logistical detention” pending transfer to the authorities.39 
Mohammed was detained by United Kingdom forces from 7 April 2010 to 25 July 2010, 
when he was transferred to the Afghan authorities.40 
 
Mohammed brought a claim to the High Court of the United Kingdom under the Human 
Rights Act 1998, for breach of his rights under the ECHR. He alleged a breach of art 5, 
claiming his detention was arbitrary after 96 hours and the requisite procedural safeguards 
were not in place.41 The High Court found in his favour,42 and the case was appealed to the 
United Kingdom Court of Appeal. A claim was also brought in tort law, alleging that the 
detention was unlawful under Afghan law. That claim will not be discussed in this paper, 
but the Court of Appeal held that the detention was unlawful under Afghan law, and that a 
claim in tort could be made.43 
 
  
35 Serdar Mohammed v Minister of Defence, above n 4, at [1].  
36 At [43]. 
37 At [43]. 
38 At [43].  
39 At [43]. 
40 At [43].  
41 At [5].  
42 Serdar Mohammed v Minister of Defence [2014] WEHC 1369 (QB). 
43 At [9].  
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As in Hassan, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the detention was governed by the 
ECHR, as Mohammed was under the control of United Kingdom forces.44 However, the 
Court in Mohammed held that there is no IHL authority to detain in NIAC, and that the 
detention was unlawful after 96 hours (the time allowed under ISAF policy).45 Further, the 
procedural safeguards required by art 5 were not met.46 Thus, although these cases have 
many similarities, the results differed due to the divergent IHL regimes for detention in 
IAC and NIAC.  
 
D Detention in IHL 
 
The law regarding detention in IAC is laid out in the Geneva Conventions, and is well 
accepted.47 The rules and procedures of detention vary, depending on whether the persons 
concerned are classified as prisoners of war, medical or religious personnel, or, civilians 
and others who do not have prisoner of war status. 
 
Prisoner of war status is granted to those classified as lawful combatants, including 
members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict (who have not forfeited their 
entitlement to prisoner of war status), and other specific categories of persons who are not 
members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict but are entitled to prisoner of war 
status upon capture.48 Article 21 of the Third Geneva Convention (GCIII) provides that 
“The Detaining Power may subject prisoners of war to internment”.49 This is based on the 
principle of military necessity, as “…the purpose of prisoner of war internment is to prevent 
  
44 At [99] and [105].  
45 At [9]. 
46 At [9].  
47 Debuf, above n 1, at 228; Leslie C Green The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (3rd ed, Juris 
Publishing, Manchester, 2008) at 224; and see also Horst Fischer “Protection of Prisoners in War” in Dieter 
Fleck (ed) The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) 367 
at 371. 
48 Debuf, above n 1, at 188.  
49 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 75 UNTS 972 (opened for signature 12 
August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) [Geneva Convention III], art 21.  
   
16 
 
members of the enemy’s armed forces from returning to the battlefield…”.50 Medical and 
religious personnel may not be interned on the basis of GCIII, as they enjoy special status 
“…based on the exclusively humanitarian nature of their function…”.51 Instead, they are 
protected by provisions in the First and Second Geneva Conventions (GCI and GCII), 
designed to allow them to carry out their functions where necessary. For example, art 37 
GCII provides that where medical personnel from a ship fall into the hands of the enemy, 
“… they may continue to carry out their duties as long as this is necessary for the care of 
the wounded and sick…”, and should be sent back to their ship when practicable.52 
 
The remaining category is civilians and other persons who do not have prisoner of war 
status. Their internment is authorised by the Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV),53 and the 
rules for internment of civilians in situations of IAC and occupation are slightly different. 
Regarding IAC, art 42 states “The internment or placing in assigned residence of protected 
persons may be ordered only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely 
necessary”.54 Article 78 applies in occupation, and states that internment is possible “If the 
Occupying Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security…”. As well as 
providing the bases on which detention can occur, the Conventions set out rules for 
treatment of prisoners during internment,55 and for their release.56  
 
Thus, detention in IAC is authorised and regulated by the Geneva Conventions. The status 
of detention in NIAC is much less clear. While a number of IHL rules apply to detention 
  
50 Debuf, above n 1, at 228.  
51 Debuf, above n 1, at 265.  
52 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of the Armed Forces at Sea 75 UNTS 971 (opened for signature 12 August 1949, entered into force 
21 October 1950) [Geneva Convention II], art 37; see also Debuf, above n 1, at 265-273. 
53 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 75 UNTS 973 (opened 
for signature 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) [Geneva Convention IV]; see also Green, 
above n 47, at 225.  
54 See also art 42(2), regarding voluntary internment.  
55 Art 27. 
56 Art 132(1).  
   
17 
 
in NIAC, they do not authorise detention or provide comprehensive protections.57  This 
difference is due to the fact that, when the Geneva Conventions were drafted, IAC was the 
focus, and states were unwilling to afford protections to detainees from non-state groups.58 
The relevant law can be found in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (CA3),59 
Additional Protocol II to the Conventions (APII),60 and art 75 of Additional Protocol I to 
the Conventions (API).61 CA3 applies in NIAC occurring in territory of parties to the 
Geneva Conventions, and provides a general guarantee against “outrages upon human 
dignity”, including “degrading treatment”. The Article also requires that sentences and 
executions be pronounced by a “…regularly constituted court…”.  However, CA3 fails to 
define its own content, such as a regularly constituted court, and, as Jelena Pejic states 
“…does not provide anywhere near sufficient guidance for the myriad of legal and 
protection issues that arise in conflicts not of an international character”.62 APII provides 
slightly more specific protection to detainees, but is of more limited application than CA3, 
as it only applies in conflicts which take place in territory of a party to the Geneva 
Conventions, and where:63  
 
  
57 See Emily Crawford The Treatment of Combatants and Insurgents under the Law of Armed Conflict 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010) at 48. 
58 Crawford, above n 57, at 69-75.  
59 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 
75 UNTS 31 (opened for signature 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) [Geneva Convention 
I], art 3(1); Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members 
of Armed Forces at Sea 75 UNTS 85 (opened for signature 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 
1950) [Geneva Convention II], art 3(1); Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 UNTS 
135 (adopted 21 October 1950, opened for signature 12 August 1949) [Geneva Convention III] art 3(1); 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 75 UNTS 287 (opened for signature 
12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) [Geneva Convention IV], art 3(1) [Common Article 3]. 
60 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) 1125 UNTS 609 (opened for signature 8 June 
1977, entered into force 7 December 1978). 
61 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 1125 UNTS 17512 (opened for signature 8 June 1977, 
entered into force 7 December 1978) [Protocol I], art 75. 
62 Jelena Pejic “The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More than Meets the Eye” (2011) 93 IRRC 189 
at 205.  
63 Art 1.  
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 …dissident armed forces or other organised armed groups, which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory so as to enable them to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations… 
 
APII provides similar guarantees of humane treatment to CA3, including a provision to 
protect those whose liberty has been restricted: Article 5 outlines minimum standards of 
treatment for persons deprived of liberty in relation to armed conflict, covering things like 
provision of food and water, working conditions, and medical examinations.  Finally, art 
75 of API provides, in both IAC and NIAC, protections for persons in “…the power of a 
Party to the conflict and who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the 
Conventions or under this Protocol”.  Article 75 guarantees humane treatment through 
prohibitions against acts like torture, and outrages upon personal dignity.  It also requires 
that sentences and penalties must only be given by an “… impartial and regularly 
constituted court”.  
 
While the combination of these provisions provides some measure of protection in NIAC, 
it does not constitute a thorough regime. Further, and most importantly for the purposes of 
this paper, there is no IHL treaty rule setting out authority and grounds for detention in 
NIAC. 
E Interaction between IHL and IHRL 
 
There is consensus among a number of international bodies, including the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) and Human Rights Committee, that IHRL continues to apply during 
armed conflict.64 For example, in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the ICJ held that 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) applies in armed conflict, 
unless derogated from under its art 4.65 The same approach was reaffirmed in the ICJ’s 
  
64 John Cerone “Jurisdiction and Power: The Intersection of Human Rights Law and the Law of Non-
International Armed Conflict in an Extraterritorial Context” (2007) 40 Israel L Rev 396 at 401.  
65 Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226 at 240.  
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Construction of a Wall Advisory Opinion.66 The parallel application of IHL and IHRL 
means conflict between these two areas of law is possible, unsurprising considering that, 
while both areas of law endeavour to protect human rights, military necessity is a 
fundamental principle of IHL.67  Many commentators expect incongruity between the two 
areas of law to be solved by application of the lex specialis principle,68 a principle 
frequently used to reconcile conflict between competing legal norms.69 The lex specialis 
principle means the rule more specific to the subject matter will be used:  “The reasons for 
preferring the more specific rule are that it is close to the particular subject matter and takes 
better account of the uniqueness of the context.”70 Even when the lex specialis has been 
determined, the lex generalis remains present and must be taken into account when 
interpreting the lex specialis.71 This is the most common approach, although as Silvia 
Borelli points out, it does not strictly correspond to the Latin maxim, which implies the 
“disapplication or displacement of the general law in favour of the special law”.72 The 
  
66 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136 at 178.  
67 See Serdar Mohammed v Minister of Defence, above n 4, at [164].  
68 See Marco Sassoli and Laura M Olson “The Relationship between Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law Where it Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in non-International Armed Conflicts” 
(2008) 90 IRRC 599 at 621; Cedric De Koker “Hassan v United Kingdom: The Interaction of Human Rights 
Law and International Humanitarian Law with regard to the Deprivation of Liberty in Armed Conflict” 
(2015) 31 Utrecht J Intl & Eur L 90 at 90; and Jean d’Aspremont and Elodie Tranchez “The Quest for a Non-
Conflictual Coexistence of International Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law: Which Role for the Lex 
Specialis Principle?” in Robert Kolb and Gloria Gaggioli (eds) Research Handbook on Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2013) 223 at 225.  
69 Noam Lubell “Parallel Application of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights 
Law: An Examination of the Debate” (2007) 40 Israel L Rev 648 at 655.  Contrast with Marko Milanovic “A 
Norm Conflict Perspective on the Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law” (2010) 14 JCSL 459. 
70 Sassoli and Olson, above n 68, at 603.  
71 Sassoli and Olson, above n 68, at 605. 
72 Silvia Borelli “The (Mis)-Use of General Principles of Law: Lex Specialis and the Relationship between 
International Human Rights Law and the Laws of Armed Conflict” in Laura Pneschi (ed) General Principles 
of Law: The Role of the Judiciary (Springer, 2015) (forthcoming).  
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International Law Commission has described lex specialis as a “widely accepted maxim of 
legal interpretation and technique for the resolution of normative conflicts”.73  
 
Despite consensus about the parallel application of IHL and IHRL in armed conflict, the 
ECtHR has been reluctant to fully engage with IHL,74 even when cases before it have 
involved conflict.75 In cases concerning the Chechen-Russian conflict, the Court did not 
expressly discuss IHL, even though this was a “clear situation” in which it could have done 
so.76 In Isayeva v Russia, the Court examined whether there had been a breach of art 2 of 
the ECHR (the right to life) but did not clearly address IHL,77 even though submissions 
specifically raised the relevant rules of IHL.78 A similar approach was taken to conflict in 
Eastern Turkey.79 In Ӧzkan and Others v Turkey, the ECtHR identified that armed conflict 
had occurred in the South-East of Turkey, between Turkish security forces and members 
of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).80 When determining whether art 2 of the ECHR 
was violated, the Court did not refer to IHL.81 Cases like these have led to an expectation 
that the ECtHR will not substantively engage with IHL,82 despite evidence of conflict.  
 
  
73 International Law Commission Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006) at [56]; contrast with Milanovic, above n 69.  
74 Michael Kearney “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the European Convention on Human Rights” (2002) 5 
TCLR 126 at 147.  
75 Christine Byron “A Blurring of the Boundaries: The Application of International Humanitarian Law by 
Human Rights Bodies” (2007) 47 VJIL 839 at 849; and see also Silvia Borelli “Jaloud v Netherlands and 
Hassan v United Kingdom: Time for a Principled Approach in the Application of the ECHR to Military 
Action Abroad” (2015) 16 QIL 25 at 33-34.  
76 Byron, above n 75, at 854.  
77 Isayeva v Russia (2005) 41 EHRR 39 (Former First Section, ECHR) at [200]. 
78 At [162]-[167].  
79 Sassoli and Olson, above n 68, at 600-601. “  
80 Ahmet Ӧzkan and Others v Turkey (21689/93) Section II ECHR, 6 April 2004 at [85].  
81 At [296]-[330].  
82 Samuel Hartridge “The European Court of Human Rights’ Engagement with International Humanitarian 
Law” in Derek Jinks, Jackson N Maogoto and Solon Solomon (eds) Applying International Humanitarian 
Law in Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies (Online ed, Springer, 2014) 257 at 277-278. 
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III The Approach in Hassan 
 
Hassan is an important turning point in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. It was the first case in 
which a state argued that its obligations under art 5 should be disapplied or interpreted in 
light of IHL,83 and led to the ECtHR’s most direct discussion of the interaction between 
IHL and IHRL. As it is clear that the ECHR applies extraterritorially in situations of 
imprisonment,84 the question to be answered by the court in Hassan was how the ECHR 
would apply, in armed conflict.85 The majority (ten out of fourteen judges)86 began its 
discussion of the interaction between art 5 and IHL by stating:87 
 
It has long been established that the list of grounds of permissible detention in Article 
5 §1 does not include internment or preventive detention when there is no intention to 
bring criminal charges within a reasonable time.  
 
The Court then acknowledged the powers to detain in IAC, set out in GCIII and GCIV.88  
Proponents of the lex specialis approach would expect the Court, having identified a 
possible conflict between IHL and IHRL, to determine and apply the most specific regime. 
Instead, the focus of the Court’s reasoning moved to art 31 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, para 3 of which states that interpretation of a treaty will take into 
account:89 
 
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions;  
  
83 Hassan v United Kingdom, above n 3, at [99]. (29750/09) Grand Chamber, ECHR 16 September 2014 at 
[99]. 
84 See above at 11; see also Tomuschat, above n 14, at 366.  
85 Borelli “Jaloud v Netherlands and Hassan v United Kingdom”, above n 75, at 26. 
86 De Koker, above n 68, at 92.  
87 At [97] (emphasis added). 
88 At [97]. See above at Part IID.  
89 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980), art 31(3).   
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(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties. 
 
This approach (referred to as systemic interpretation)90 led the Court to examine IHL rules 
and practice of detention in IAC. According to the Court, state practice has been to detain 
in IAC without derogating from the ECHR.91 This, and the Court’s desire to incorporate 
IHL in its interpretation of art 5, resulted in the conclusion that IHL (and the authority it 
provides to detain in IAC) can be taken into account under art 5, if pleaded by a state.92 So, 
as the detention of Hassan was in accordance with GCIII and GCIV, the ECtHR concluded 
there was no breach of art 5.93 
 
In Mohammed, the United Kingdom Secretary of State submitted that the reasoning from 
Hassan should apply, and that IHL should alter art 5.94 However, the Court held that the 
existence of IHL rules authorising detention in IAC was central to the ECtHR’s reasoning 
in Hassan, so the same reasoning could only apply if IHL provides a basis for detention in 
NIAC.95 The Court concluded there is currently no IHL authority to detain in NIAC,96 and 
that detention in NIAC could not be consistent with art 5.97 The Court did not comment on 
the validity of the reasoning in Hassan, even though that decision has been widely 
criticised. By stating “the reasoning in Hassan can be extended to a situation of non-
international armed conflict… if in a non-international armed conflict international 
humanitarian law provides a legal basis for detention”, the Court has left open the 
possibility that the reasoning from Hassan could apply to NIAC. Hassan is therefore 
significant for the future relationship between art 5 and IHL in both IAC and NIAC.  
  
90 d’Aspremont and Tranchez, above n 68, at 235.  
91 At [101].   
92 At [107].  
93 At [110].  
94 Serdar Mohammed v Minister of Defence, above n 4, at [122].  
95 At [123]. 
96 For discussion of other bases of detention see below at Part VI. 
97 At [251]. 
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Hassan is problematic for numerous reasons, most of which were identified by the four 
dissenting judges,98 and have been expanded upon by commentators since the decision was 
released. The major shortfall of the reasoning in Hassan is that it does not give adequate 
weight to the fact that art 5 includes an exhaustive list of grounds for detention, which does 
not include internment in armed conflict.99 The way the majority reads in another ground 
for detention (based on IHL) undermines art 5, resulting in an unprecedented amendment 
of the EHCR. While other IHRL treaties prohibit ‘arbitrary’ arrest or detention, the ECHR 
specifically lists the bases upon which a person can be deprived of their liberty.100 This has 
previously been a focal point in ECHR jurisprudence.101 In the House of Lords Al-Jedda 
decision, Baroness Hale stated:102 
 
The drafters of the Convention had a choice between a general prohibition of 
“arbitrary” detention, as provided in article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and a list of permitted grounds for detention. They deliberately chose the latter.  
 
The same point was emphasised in the ECtHR judgment in Al-Jedda,103 and has been 
reiterated by scholars. In 2014, Samuel Hartridge wrote “… the weight of authority from 
the Court suggests the power to detain under IHL cannot operate as an additional ground 
of detention, separate to those found in Article 5”.104 The finding that there is another 
ground for detention under art 5 is therefore surprising, and the reasoning used to reach 
that point is questionable.  
 
As noted, the majority relied on state practice to find that art 5 could be interpreted in 
accordance with IHL. The practice relied on was the fact that no state has derogated from 
  
98 Hassan v United Kingdom, above n 3, per Judge Spano, joined by Judges Nicolaou, Bianku, and 
Kalaydjieva, dissenting.  
99 See appendix.  
100 Sassoli and Olson, above n 68, at 618.  
101 Borelli “Jaloud v Netherlands and Hassan v United Kingdom”, above n 75, at 39. 
102 Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58 [2008] 1 AC 332 at [122].  
103 Al-Jedda v United Kingdom, above n 13, at [99]. 
104 Hartridge, above n 82, at 283.  
   
24 
 
art 5 to detain persons on the basis of GCIII and GCIV.105 However, the majority did not 
explore other possible reasons for such practice, and did not acknowledge that there may 
be political reasons behind states’ choices not to derogate.106 Derogation entails 
acknowledging the jurisdiction of the ECHR, increasing states’ vulnerability to a range of 
human rights claims which they are unlikely to want to face. The Court also used state 
practice regarding the ICCPR (art 9 of which is the equivalent of art 5 of the ECHR)107 to 
support its conclusion.108 As the dissenting judges explain, there is a fundamental 
distinction between art 9 of the ICCPR and art 5 of the ECHR, meaning the ICCPR practice 
is unhelpful:109 The ICCPR prohibits ‘arbitrary detention’ and does not provide an 
exhaustive list of permitted types of detention. Thus, states which do not derogate under 
art 9 in situations of conflict may act based on the belief that detention authorised by IHL 
is not arbitrary. In contrast, the exhaustive list of grounds in art 5 do not leave room for 
such a belief, and the ECtHR has relied on irrelevant practice to determine that the ECHR 
has been amended. 
 
Further, the Court has gone too far in ensuring that IHRL and IHL coexist. The majority 
relied on Varnava and Others v Turkey, in which the ECtHR stated art 2 of the ECHR 
should be “… interpreted in so far as possible …” in light of IHL.110 The Court seems to 
have overlooked the phrase “in so far as possible”; it will not always be possible to interpret 
the ECHR in a way that takes IHL into account. IHL and IHRL, while similar, have 
different objectives. IHRL focuses on protecting individuals’ rights, and while IHL does 
this to some extent, it is also based on the principle of military necessity and designed to 
allow commanders to achieve military objectives.111 In this case, the fact that art 5 has 
  
105 Hassan v United Kingdom, above n 3, at [101].  
106 William Abresch “A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human 
Rights in Chechnya” (2005) 16 EJIL 741 at 756. 
107 See appendix.  
108 At [101]. 
109 At [14] per Judge Spano, joined by Judges Nicolaou, Bianku, and Kalaydjieva, dissenting.  
110 Varnava and Others v Turkey (2010) 50 EHHR 21 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) at [185]; and Hassan v 
United Kingdom, above n 3, at [17] per Judge Spano, joined by Judges Nicolaou, Bianku, and Kalaydjieva, 
dissenting.  
111 Hartridge, above n 82, at 260.  
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exhaustive grounds which do not include internment in armed conflict means there is no 
room for IHL detention in that provision, and that Hassan “drives the convergence between 
international human rights law and the law of armed conflict too far”.112 As the dissenting 
judges stated, “…the majority’s resolution of this case … constitutes an attempt to 
reconcile norms of international law that are irreconcilable on the facts of this case”113, 
this is area where IHL and IHRL are not compatible.  
 
Finally, the reasoning in Hassan undermines art 15 of the ECHR, which permits derogation 
from certain rights obligations in times of emergency.114 In Hassan, the ECtHR created a 
new mode of quasi-derogation:115If a state pleads that IHL relevant to IAC should be taken 
into account, the ECHR can be modified accordingly.116 This contradicts the existence of 
art 15, as explained in the dissenting judgment in Hassan:117  
 
There would have been no reason to include this structural feature if, when war rages, 
the Convention’s fundamental guarantees automatically became silent or were 
displaced in substance, by granting the Member States additional and unwritten 
grounds for limiting fundamental rights based solely on other applicable norms of 
international law. 
 
The stance taken also contradicts the previous jurisprudence of the ECtHR on this issue, as 
“The Court has always been strict in requiring that a derogation should be in place before 
accepting any claim that rights could be limited in light of the existence of an 
emergency”.118 Furthermore, Hassan is contrary to the approach taken by the ICJ toward 
  
112 Aughey and Sari, above n 9, at 65.   
113 At [6] per Judge Spano, joined by Judges Nicolaou, Bianku, and Kalaydjieva, dissenting.  
114 See appendix.  
115 Bart van der Sloot “Is All Fair in Love and War? An Analysis of the Case Law on Article 15 ECHR (2015) 
53 Mil L & L War Rev 319 at 350-351.  
116 Hassan v United Kingdom, above n 3, at [107].  
117 At [8] per Judge Spano, joined by Judges Nicolaou, Bianku, and Kalaydjieva, dissenting.   
118 Borelli “Jaloud v Netherlands and Hassan v United Kingdom”, above n 75, at 40.  
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the ICCPR, which confirmed in the Nuclear Weapons Opinion that the ICCPR only ceases 
to operate in times of war when art 4 (the equivalent of art 15) is in operation.119 
 
The majority in Hassan disregarded the clear wording of the ECHR in numerous ways in 
an attempt to reconcile these conflicting branches of law. It went beyond the clear wording 
of art 5, undermined the status of art 15, and has unsurprisingly been met with a wide range 
of criticism. Responses have suggested the preferable alternative is to require states to 
derogate from their ECHR obligations (to a necessary and proportionate extent) under art 
15. However, the validity of this suggestion is not clear. Previously, derogations have only 
occurred in relation to conflicts happening in the territory of the derogating state, so 
requiring derogation in situations like Hassan and Mohammed would be another change in 
ECtHR jurisprudence. 
 
IV Derogation as an Alternative to the Reasoning in Hassan  
A Article 15 
 
Article 15 permits derogation from certain ECHR obligations (including art 5) in times of 
“… war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation…”.120 Measures taken 
in response to the emergency must be “strictly required” and not inconsistent with the 
state’s other international law obligations.121 Requiring derogation under art 15 has been 
suggested as a logical alternative to the approach in Hassan.  For example, Borelli’s 
position is that:122 
 
… whenever State Parties act in the context of an armed conflict… it should be for 
States to derogate from their obligations under the ECHR if they wish to benefit from 
the greater latitude which the greater rules of IHL can afford them.  
 
  
119 See Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, above n 65, at 240.   
120 See appendix; ECHR, above n 5.  
121 Art 15(1). 
122 Borelli “Jaloud v Netherlands and Hassan v United Kingdom”, above n 75, at 27.  
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The dissenting judges in Hassan stated that derogation under art 15 was the only way in 
which the United Kingdom could have applied the IHL rules of detention without violating 
art 5,123 and the ICJ has also emphasised that IHRL obligations apply unless a valid 
derogation is in place.124 However, while use of art 15 seems at first glance like a 
straightforward answer to the problems posed by Hassan, its applicability in situations of 
extraterritorial armed conflict has not been extensively explored either in scholarship or by 
the ECtHR, and the possibility of such application has been dismissed by many. In fact, as 
the Court identified in Hassan:125 
  
Leaving aside a number of declarations made by the United Kingdom between 1954 
and 1966 in respect of powers put in place to quell uprisings in a number of its 
colonies, the derogations made by Contracting States under Article 15 of the 
Convention have all made reference to emergencies arising within the territory of the 
derogating State.  
 
In Al-Jedda, Lord Bingham opined that the requirements of art 15 were very unlikely to 
ever be met “…when a state has chosen to conduct an overseas peacekeeping operation … 
from which it could withdraw”,126 implying that derogation can only apply in an emergency 
which a state cannot choose to avoid. More recently in Hassan, the United Kingdom argued 
it had not derogated from the ECHR because it was not state practice to do so, and “since 
the Convention could and did accommodate detention in such cases” (based on the belief 
that art 5 can incorporate IHL).127 Despite these views, there has not yet been a conclusive 
statement from the ECtHR on this issue. In Al-Jedda, although the United Kingdom had 
argued that it is not possible to enter a derogation under art 15 in an IAC,128 the Court’s 
response did not address the correctness of that argument. Instead, it noted that the United 
  
123 At [9] per Judge Spano, joined by Judges Nicolaou, Bianku, and Kalaydjieva, dissenting.  
124 See Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, above n 65, at 240; and Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, above n 66, at 178. 
125 At [40].  
126 Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence, above n 102, at [38] per Lord Bingham; see also at [150] per 
Lord Brown. 
127 At [90].  
128 Al-Jedda v United Kingdom, above n 13, at [92].  
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Kingdom had not purported to derogate in that situation.129 Bart van der Sloot took this to 
mean art 15 could possibly be invoked “… with reference to extraterritorial derogations in 
case of a State’s forces engaged in operations abroad”.130 While it is promising that the 
Court did not explicitly agree with the United Kingdom, it is also not decisive and the issue 
requires further analysis. The state practice is also not conclusive, as the reason behind the 
lack of derogation could be that states do not wish to acknowledge extraterritorial ECHR 
jurisdiction. For example, on 7 April 2004, the United Kingdom Armed Forces Minister 
stated:131   
 
…The ECHR can have no application to the activities of the United Kingdom in Iraq 
because the citizens of Iraq had no rights under the ECHR prior to the military action 
by the Coalition forces.  
 
As explained above though,132 ECHR jurisdiction is not contentious in situations of 
detention. This part will therefore endeavour to determine whether derogation is a viable 
alternative to the reasoning in Hassan, and will take into account the facts of Mohammed, 
due to the Court of Appeal’s indication that the reasoning from Hassan would be followed 
if IHL authorised detention in NIAC. The main question to be answered is whether a valid 
derogation could be made in respect of an extraterritorial military operation. The greatest 
barrier to the application of art 15(1) in that situation is the requirement that there must be 
a war or public emergency threatening the life of the nation. The other requirements, that 
measures taken must be strictly required (also known as the proportionality 
requirement)133, in conformity with other international obligations, and that notification 
  
129 At [98]. 
130 van der Sloot, above n 115, at 345-346. 
131 Adam Ingram MP, Ministry of Defence, Letter to Adam Price MP, 7 April 2004; See also  Bill Bowring 
“How will the ECtHR Deal with the UK in Iraq?” in Phil Shiner and Andrew Williams (eds) The Iraq War 
and International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2008) 285 at 290.  
132 See above at 11.  
133 Jan-Peter Loof “Crisis Situations, Counter Terrorism and Derogation from the European Convention on 
Human Rights, A Threat Analysis” in Antoine Buyse (ed) Margins of Conflict. The ECHR and Transitions 
to and from Armed Conflict (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2010) 35 at 40.  
   
29 
 
must be given, could be satisfied without difficulty in a situation of extraterritorial military 
activity.  
B A Public Emergency Threatening the Life of the Nation 
 
Article 15(1) permits derogation “in time of war or other public emergency” (sometimes 
referred to as the requirement of ‘exceptional threat’). ‘In time of war’ refers to situations 
of IAC,134 one example of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. It is 
therefore important to examine the broader meaning of the public emergency 
requirement.135 In Lawless v Ireland, the ECtHR explained that the requirement referred to 
“…an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and 
constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which the State is 
composed…”.136 Later cases have also required that there must be imminent danger.137 The 
major issue, regarding cases like Hassan and Mohammed, is that art 15 seems to require an 
emergency in and affecting the nation entering the derogation – in Hassan and Mohammed, 
the United Kingdom. However, the jurisprudence surrounding art 15 indicates that the 
requirement is broader than it initially appears. 
 
First, recent case law shows that what constitutes a public emergency is adapting in 
accordance with modern issues. Whereas older case law involved emergencies caused by 
uprisings within states by groups wishing to overthrow the government, international 
terrorism has recently been the cause of a ‘public emergency’ in the United Kingdom. On 
18 December 2001 the United Kingdom government lodged a derogation with the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe, based on the United Kingdom’s response to 
the September 11 attacks and international terrorism, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 (which provided power to arrest and detain foreign nationals believed 
  
134 van Dijk and others, above n 10, at 1059.  
135 Loof, above n 133, at 39.  
136 Lawless v Ireland (1979-80) 1 EHRR 1 at [28].  
137 See for example Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v Greece (1969) 12 Yearbook 186 
(EComHR).  
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to be a risk to national security).138 As there would be no immediate possibility of 
deportation, such detention would usually be a breach of art 5.139 A case challenging this 
legislation and derogation eventually made its way to the House of Lords (A and Others v 
the United Kingdom).140 The House of Lords held there was a public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation, but that the measures the government had taken were 
disproportionate as they only applied to non-nationals.141 The applicants then lodged 
claims to the ECtHR, where the Court held it was acceptable for the United Kingdom 
government to decide there was a credible terrorist threat, and that it was an imminent 
threat as it could be carried out without warning at any time.142 Like the lower courts, the 
ECtHR concluded that the measures taken in response to the emergency were 
disproportionate as they “discriminated unjustifiably” against non-nationals.143  
 
Even more recently, France entered a derogation to the ECHR in the wake of the terrorist 
attacks that occurred in Paris on 13 November 2015.144 Commentator Marko Milanovic 
suggests that, based on the responses of human rights groups to the emergency measures 
taken by France,145 this derogation notice is likely to be the source of litigation in both 
French courts and possibly the ECtHR.146 It is impossible to determine when or whether 
such litigation will eventuate, but if it does, it may provide an opportunity for the ECtHR 
to clarify the meaning of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. However, 
the existing case law demonstrates that the ECtHR is willing to take a broad view of this 
  
138 A and Others v United Kingdom (2009) 26 BHRC 297 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) at [11].  
139 A and Others v United Kingdom, above n 138, at [11]; see also Chahal v the United Kingdom (1996) 23 
EHRR 412 (ECHR) at [112].  
140 See A and Others v The United Kingdom (2004) UKHL 56.  
141 At [118]-[119].  
142 A and Others v United Kingdom, above n 138, at [177].  
143 At [190]. 
144 Council of Europe “Declaration Contained in a Note Verbale from the Permanent Representation of 
France, Dated 24 November 2015” (24 November 2015) <www.coe.int>.  
145 See for example Human Rights Watch “France: New Emergency Powers Threaten Rights” (24 November 
2015) <www.hrw.org>. 
146 Marko Milanovic “France Derogates from ECHR in the Wake of the Paris Attacks” (13 December 2015) 
<www.ejiltalk.org>. 
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requirement, and will not limit the application of art 15 to situations of traditional threats 
and conflicts.  
 
Second, the ECtHR has also taken a broader approach to the location (or life of the nation) 
element of the threat than may have been expected from the wording of art 15. As Aly 
Mohktar states, case law has relaxed the ‘life of the nation’ standard and “… it has been 
accepted that the whole population may be affected by events in only part of a state and 
that the derogation may be restricted to that part”.147 This is particularly evident in the case 
law regarding Northern Ireland, which indicates that the entire population does not have to 
be impacted, and that “conflict in a specific sub-region of a country may also be 
enough”:148 In Brannigan and McBride v United Kingdom, the Court allowed a derogation 
based on terrorist violence “…in Northern Ireland and elsewhere in the United 
Kingdom”.149 The United Kingdom was also able to derogate in Ireland v the United 
Kingdom, based on widespread violence in Ireland.150 In Aksoy v Turkey, the ECtHR took 
a similar approach and concluded that terrorist activity in a particular region of South-East 
Turkey had created a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.151 In each of these 
cases, derogation has been permitted when there is conflict in an area geographically 
disconnected from the rest of the nation. 
 
Furthermore, the United Kingdom was able to enter a valid derogation concerning Cyprus, 
a colony. The derogation was entered in relation to measures taken to combat an armed 
resistance movement. Even though the United Kingdom asserted there was a public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation, it did not intend to recognise Cyprus as a 
separate nation, or to argue that the whole nation of Britain was threatened.152 Instead, the 
United Kingdom submitted it was common ground that the ‘nation’ referred to for this 
  
147 Aly Mokhtar “Human Rights Obligations v Derogations: Article 15 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights” (2004) 8 IJHR 65 at 69.  
148 van der Sloot, above n 14, at 345; see also Loof, above n 133, at 41.  
149 Brannigan and McBride v United Kingdom (1994) 17 EHRR 539 (ECHR) at [47].  
150 Ireland v the United Kingdom (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25 at [212].  
151 Aksoy v Turkey (1996) 1 BHRC 625 (ECHR).  
152 Greece v United Kingdom (1958) 18 HRLJ 348 (EComHR) at [113].  
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purpose was Cyprus, “… not the United Kingdom or the Commonwealth”.153 The 
Commission concluded that:154 
 
… the term ‘nation’ means the people and its institutions, even in a non-self-governing 
territory, or in other words, the organized society, including the authorities responsible 
both under domestic and international law for the maintenance of law and order. 
 
On this basis, a valid derogation was entered concerning a threat that was certainly not a 
threat to the entire nation of the United Kingdom, or even closely geographically 
connected. Thus, the case law of the ECtHR makes clear that a public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation does not have to impact the territory of the entire nation, 
and may be geographically disconnected from the derogating state.   
C The ECtHR’s Approach to Interpretation 
 
A noteworthy element of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence is that the Court acts with deference 
towards the decisions of national parliaments and governments. The Court has explained 
this ‘margin of appreciation’ in almost all cases concerning derogation,155 often with 
identical wording:156 
 
… the national authorities are in principle in a better position than the international 
judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope 
of derogations necessary to avert it. Accordingly, in this matter a wide margin of 
appreciation should be left to the national authorities. 
 
  
153 At [130].  
154 At [130].  
155 Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aoilain “From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Application of the 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights” 
(2001) 23 HRQ 625 at 633. 
156 Brannigan and McBride v United Kingdom, above n 149, at [43]; A and Others v United Kingdom, above 
n 138, at [173]; Aksoy v Turkey, above n 151, at [68]; and Ireland v the United Kingdom, above n 150, at 
[207].  
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This approach is based on the principle of subsidiarity – the idea that the Convention 
judicial system is subsidiary to domestic systems.157 However, the ECtHR also frequently 
notes that parties do not enjoy an “unlimited power of appreciation”, and that European 
supervision accompanies the domestic margin of appreciation.158 The approach has been 
criticised, and many have argued that the Court should take a more active role in its 
‘supervision’.159 At present though, the jurisprudence of the Court suggests it will continue 
to give such a margin to national authorities, especially in decisions about whether there is 
a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.  
 
In its judgments, the ECtHR has also stressed that the Convention is a living instrument, 
and must be interpreted with regard to contemporary conditions;160 this approach is 
“…firmly rooted in the Court’s case law”.161  This is another factor which may mean the 
Court could allow a wide interpretation of art 15, considering that the nature of conflict has 
changed dramatically since the formation of the Convention.  However, application of this 
approach is not as clear as the margin of appreciation approach: It has been suggested that 
this approach may only apply to substantive ECHR provisions, as opposed to non-
substantive procedural provisions.162 For example, in Hassan, the United Kingdom argued 
that the concept of jurisdiction was not subject to the “living instrument” doctrine”.163 
Thus, this approach may be of limited assistance if those arguments are accepted and if art 
15 is considered a non-substantive provision.  
 
D Applicability of art 15 to the facts of Hassan and Serdar Mohammed 
 
  
157 Gross and Aoilain, above n 155, at 640.  
158 See Brannigan and McBride v United Kingdom, above n 156, at [43].  
159 See Rhonda Powell “Human Rights, Derogation and Anti-Terrorist Detention” (2006) 69 SLR 79 at 82; 
Gross and Aoilain, above n 155, at 628 “; and Harris and others, above n 10, at 644.  
160 George Letsas A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2007) at 59.  
161 Matthews v United Kingdom (1999) 28 EHRR 361 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) at [39].  
162 Letsas, above n 160, at 68.  
163 Hassan v United Kingdom, above n 3, at [70].  
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This discussion will show that, if the ECtHR was willing to consider allowing a derogation 
effective outside the territory of the derogating state, arguments could be made that there 
was a threat to the life of the nation, on the facts of both Hassan and Mohammed. The fact 
that the Court is willing to allow a wide margin of appreciation to domestic bodies lends 
support to the possibility that it may consider such a derogation to be valid if all 
requirements are satisfied, as does the possibility of the ‘living instrument’ approach to 
interpretation. Allowing derogation would also be in line with the jurisdiction of the ECHR. 
As the Convention applies extraterritorially where the parties have the requisite degree of 
control, it is logical to extend derogation to such situations, if a public emergency can be 
shown to exist. In the High Court Mohammed decision, Leggat J stated:164 
 
Now that the Convention has been interpreted, however, as having such extraterritorial 
effect … Article 15 must be interpreted in a way which reflects this. It cannot be right 
to interpret jurisdiction under Article 1 as encompassing the exercise of power and 
control by a state on the territory of another state … unless at the same time Article 15 
is interpreted in a way which is consonant with that position and permits derogation 
to the extent that it is strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. 
 
The following discussion proceeds on the assumption that the ECtHR would primarily have 
the derogating state in mind when assessing the exceptional threat requirement, rather than 
the state where the conflict is occurring. This approach is logical and in accordance with 
previous ECtHR case law.165 If a court would instead consider whether Afghanistan or Iraq 
was experiencing a public emergency threatening the life of the nation, the answer would 
be likely to be affirmative, considering the conflicts occurring at the relevant times. 
1 Hassan (Iraq) 
 
  
164 Serdar Mohammed v Minister of Defence, above n 42, at [155]. 
165 See above at 29-30. 
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The Government submitted,166 and the Court agreed,167 that this was a situation of IAC. 
However, the fact that IAC was not occurring in the United Kingdom means its existence 
alone is unlikely to constitute a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.168 
United Kingdom forces were in Iraq at the time of Hassan’s detention as part of a coalition 
led by the United States. Justifications for the invasion were based on Iraq’s supposed 
violations of its disarmament obligations under a number of UNSCRs.169 Prime Minister 
at the time Tony Blair emphasised that weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and terrorist 
groups (in Iraq) were a threat to Britain: “My fear, deeply held, based in part on the 
intelligence that I see is that these threats come together and deliver catastrophe to our 
country and our world”.170 It is acknowledged now that “the British Government put a 
weight on available intelligence that it could not bear”, and that the threat was overstated.171 
However, in A and Others, the ECtHR stated that “…the existence of the threat to the life 
of the nation must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known 
at the time of the derogation…”.172 Whether the threat of Iraq’s supposed WMDs 
constituted a public emergency would likely depend on the time at which this was 
examined. If the derogation had been entered before doubts were confirmed as to the 
intelligence used, it is plausible that a derogation would have been valid.  
 
The timing of the United Kingdom and United States’ occupation of Iraq may also be 
important, as it is more likely that derogation would be permitted when a state is occupying 
another, due to the involvement and control occupation entails. In Al-Jedda, the House of 
Lords explained the legal status of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq: “… 
the CPA assumed all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its 
  
166 Hassan v United Kingdom, above n 3, at [86].  
167 At [104].  
168 See Debuf, above n 1, at 95.  
169 Anthony Carty “The Iraq Invasion as a Recent United Kingdom ‘Contribution to International Law’” 
(2005) 16 EJIL 143 at 144.  
170 Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom “Address to the Nation” (London, United Kingdom, 
20 March 2003).  
171 Carty, above n 169, at 145.  
172 At [177].  
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objectives, to be exercised under relevant UNSCRs…”.173 An argument could be made 
that, because the United Kingdom was occupying Iraq, it was directly threatened by what 
was occurring there. This also impacts the strength of Lord Bingham’s comment that states 
are unable to derogate when they have chosen to be involved in extra-territorial 
operations;174 if a state is an occupying power, the suggestion that it has the option to leave 
at any time has less strength. Furthermore, in Greece v United Kingdom, the Commission 
focused on the high degree of control that the United Kingdom had over Cyprus, when 
determining that the United Kingdom could enter a derogation. The United Kingdom’s 
control over Iraq during occupation was extensive,175 and is comparable to the control the 
United Kingdom exercised in Cyprus, when it was “… responsible … for the maintenance 
of law and order”.176 Thus, if detention occurred during occupation, it seems plausible that 
the occupying power could enter a valid derogation. 
2 Serdar Mohammed (Afghanistan) 
 
British forces were initially in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom – a 
coalition with the United States, “…launched against Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban and 
Al-Qaeda in consequence of the attacks of 11 September 2001 …”.177 As the Court of 
Appeal identified, at the time of Mohammed’s arrest and detention the British forces 
operated as part of ISAF, initially authorised by UNSCR 1386, and affirmed by UNSCR 
1890 in 2009.178 Both Resolutions refer to threats posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other 
extremist groups in Afghanistan,179 and UNSCR 1890 confirms that the situation in 
Afghanistan remains a threat to international peace and security. Considering that the 
ECtHR decided in A and Others that international terrorism was capable of creating a 
  
173 Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence, above n 102, at [9].  
174 See above at 27.  
175 Bowring, above n 131, at 292. 
176 Greece v United Kingdom, above n 152, at [130].  
177 Serdar Mohammed v Minister of Defence, above n 4, at [29].  
178 At [35].  
179 Resolution on the situation in Afghanistan SC Res 1386 S/RES/1386 (2001); and Resolution on extension 
of the authorization of the International Security Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) SC Res 1890 SC/RES/1890 
(2009).  
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public emergency threatening the life of the nation,180 it does not seem overly 
presumptuous to say the same about the situation in the areas of Afghanistan where the 
United Kingdom was operating.181 If it entered a derogation, the United Kingdom could 
have argued that it was operating in Afghanistan due to an emergency (international 
terrorism) threatening the United Kingdom, and that its detention procedures were a 
responsive emergency measure. Based on the above discussion, it is quite possible that 
such an argument would be accepted. 
 
E Why Derogation is a Preferable Approach  
 
Even though allowing derogation in these situations would be a significant departure from 
the norm, it is preferable to the reasoning in Hassan.182 As well as being clearly mandated 
by the ECHR, the requirements of art 15 ensure protection for human rights. The 
notification requirement means the Secretary General of the Council of Europe must be 
kept informed, which in turn means other contracting states are able to assess the relevant 
measures, and may make a complaint.183 There is therefore more transparency and control 
involved in this process. The approach taken in Hassan reaches a similar result, without 
states having to undergo:184 
 
…the openly transparent and arduous process of lodging a derogation from Article 5 
§1, the scope and legality of which is then subject to review by the domestic courts, 
and if necessary, by [the ECtHR] under Article 15. 
 
  
180 See above at 30. 
181 See also Virginia Helen Henning “Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: Has the United Kingdom 
made a Valid Derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights (2002) 17 AUILR 1263 at 1284.  
182 Borelli “Jaloud v Netherlands and Hassan v United Kingdom”, above n 75, at 27.  
183 van der Sloot, above n 115, at 323.  
184 Hassan v United Kingdom, above n 3, at [5] per Judge Spano, joined by Judges Nicolaou, Bianku, and 
Kalaydjieva, dissenting.  
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It seems more than reasonable to require states to consider and explain these human rights 
issues.185 Because the Hassan and Mohammed cases (among others) make clear that the 
ECHR applies to these situations, states entering derogations regarding detention 
procedures would not be acknowledging any jurisdiction that does not already exist. 
Further, this approach stipulates how IHL is to be taken into account, as measures 
implemented requiring derogation must still be consistent with other international 
obligations, including IHL. That criterion has played a surprisingly small part in ECtHR 
jurisprudence so far, with the Court often briefly stating it is satisfied.186 However, there is 
ample room for it to play a larger part, with IHL being an obvious source of international 
obligations.187 For example, if a valid derogation had been entered in Hassan, the Court 
could then have determined whether the IHL rules of detention were complied with.  
F Conclusion on Derogation 
 
While it would take the ECtHR’s jurisprudence in a new direction, it is plausible that a 
valid derogation could be entered in respect of extra-territorial military operations. Even 
though this may have a similar outcome to adherence to the reasoning from Hassan, use of 
the derogation procedure is preferable. Article 15 clearly dictates a procedure to be 
followed, and does so with the purpose of protecting human rights as well as possible in 
emergency situations. In contrast, the reasoning in Hassan undermines the clearly 
delineated grounds for detention in art 5 and makes for a confusing interaction between 
IHL and IHRL. While it would be best for art 15 to be reframed to be more obviously 
applicable to modern conflict, this is unlikely to happen in the near future.188 Instead, the 
next court to be faced with these issues should confirm that derogation is possible in these 
situations, and that if there is no derogation, the clear wording of the ECHR applies and 
states must act in accordance with their ECHR obligations.  
 
  
185 Borelli “The (Mis)-Use of General Principles of Law”, above n 72.  
186 See for example, Lawless v Ireland, above n 136; and Ireland v the United Kingdom, above n 150, at 
[222]. 
187 Harris and others, above n 10, at 637. 
188 van der Sloot, above n 115, at 355.  
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V The Reasoning and Result in Serdar Mohammed 
 
Regardless of whether the approach in Hassan is followed, or a derogation from ECHR 
obligations is entered, legality of detention under IHL is important: Following Hassan, 
detention must be authorised by IHL in order to alter the ECHR, and, if a state derogates 
from the ECHR it must still act in accordance with its international obligations, including 
IHL. The fact that IHL provides authority to detain in IAC is well accepted, as discussed 
in Hassan. Following Mohammed though, the IHL regarding detention in NIAC is much 
less clear. To reiterate, in Mohammed, the Court held that the reasoning from Hassan could 
not apply, as IHL does not provide authority to detain in NIAC. This is a finding of great 
significance regarding situations like Hassan and Mohammed, because, as the Court in 
Mohammed indicates, authority to detain in NIAC must therefore be found in domestic law 
or UNSCRs – both of which are problematic sources.  
 
The Court of Appeal introduced the claimed breach of art 5 by stating that the detention 
would not be unlawful “…if there was a lawful power to detain which was not arbitrary 
and the detention was subject to the requisite procedural safeguards”.189 Status of the 
detention under Afghan law was also important, because the Court decided that it would 
be “…an extraordinary and unjustifiable extension of the Strasbourg court… to decide that 
further requirements of the ECHR prevailed … over the law of Afghanistan”.190 If 
detention was authorised by Afghan law, there would be no claim under art 5.191 These 
considerations led to a discussion of the source of authority to detain in this particular 
conflict, which creates important ramifications for future conflicts. The Court examined 
three possible sources for the authority to detain: The law of Afghanistan, the relevant 
UNSCRs, and IHL.192 The Court found there was authority in Afghan law allowing United 
Kingdom forces to arrest Mohammed, but not to detain him after 10 April 2010 (he was in 
fact detained until 25 July 2010).193  
  
189 Serdar Mohammed v Minister of Defence, above n 4 at [44].  
190 At [127]. 
191 At [127].  
192 At [125].  
193 At [135].  
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The relevant UNSCR was Resolution 1890 (2009), which extended the mandate of ISAF 
and allowed Member States to take all necessary measures to fulfil that mandate.194 The 
Secretary of State argued that the Resolution provided power for British forces to detain 
for the purposes of fulfilling their mission, and thus to detain Mohammed, as he posed a 
threat to that mission.195 In response, the Court held that the UNSCR granted ISAF 
authority to detain, but that it was up to ISAF to determine the conditions of detention.196 
The detention policy (ISAF SOP 132) dictated that detention could only occur for 96 
hours.197 So, the United Kingdom policy to detain for more than 96 hours was outside the 
scope of the UNSCR’s authorisation.198  
 
The Court then examined whether IHL provided authority to detain in NIAC – a 
controversial issue which had not previously been the subject of an ECtHR decision. First, 
it considered treaty sources, namely CA3, and APII.199 The reasoning will be discussed in 
more depth below,200 but the Court concluded that IHL treaties do not authorise detention 
in NIAC.201 It also examined whether authorisation could be found in CIL and concluded 
that, while such a power would be logical, it is not possible to base authority to detain in 
NIAC on CIL.202 Thus, authority for detention in NIAC must come from either domestic 
law, or UNSCRs.203 Relying on either source to provide authority to detain in NIAC is 
problematic, especially in the context of forces acting extraterritorially.  
 
  
194 Resolution on extension of the authorisation of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, 
above n 179.  
195 At [142].  
196 At [149]. For a critique of this reasoning see Sean Aughey & Aurel Sari “The Authority to Detain in 
NIACs Revisited: Serdar Mohammed in the Court of Appeal” (5 August 2015) <www.ejiltalk.org>. 
197 Serdar Mohammed v Minister of Defence [2015] EWCA Civ 843, above n 4, at [149]-[150].  
198 At [156].  
199 At [165].  
200 This finding will be further discussed in Part VII. 
201 At [219]. 
202 At [215].  
203 See Andrea Bianchi and Yasmin Naqvi International Humanitarian Law and Terrorism (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2011) at 329.  
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VI  Authority to Detain in Armed Conflict 
A Authority to Detain in Domestic Law 
 
The Court found no authority to detain Mohammed in the domestic law of Afghanistan, 
because the relevant obligations (created by the executive in the Military Technical 
Agreement between ISAF and the interim administration of Afghanistan, and by 
UNSCRs)204 did not have the status of domestic law in Afghanistan.205 This highlights the 
fact that in NIAC, especially one involving foreign intervention, it is often not possible or 
desirable to rely on domestic law. It is not uncommon for institutions to cease to function 
as normal in NIAC. The High Court in Mohammed noted that “The Afghan legal system 
was almost entirely destroyed when Afghanistan was ruled by the Taliban and has had to 
be rebuilt”.206 Foreign intervention meant that new forces were operating in Afghanistan 
and, as in the case of British forces,207existing legislation did not give them power to detain 
for imperative reasons of security, for a practical length of time. In NIAC it is not realistic 
to anticipate that relevant obligations will be implemented via domestic law, perhaps 
emphasised by the fact that the United Kingdom made no attempt to seek a change of 
Afghan law to accommodate their policy.208 Furthermore, implementing the various 
agreements between the Government of Afghanistan and the assisting states, through 
legislation, would have been a daunting task.209 Afghanistan did not consent to English law 
applying on its territory, and the United Kingdom at no point attempted to apply its own 
detention laws in Afghanistan. Regardless, detention by a military authority of a civilian 
for more than 96 hours would also not have been legal under United Kingdom law.210 
  
204 At [36].  
205 At [135].  
206 Serdar Mohammed v Minister of Defence, above n 42, at [64]. See also Ali Wardak “Building a post-war 
Justice System in Afghanistan” (2004) 41 Crime Law Soc Change 319 at 328, and Nasreen Ghufran 
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This problem is unlikely to be unique to the conflict in Afghanistan: foreign intervention 
in NIAC is common, and raises the complex question of whose law applies.211 For example, 
in cases concerning Iraq it was argued that the MNF had the power to arrest and acted as 
agent for the Iraqi Courts.212 The Iraqi government had declared that it would be 
responsible for detention, with assistance from the MNF.213 However, the British forces 
were never given an express statutory power to detain in Iraq,214 meaning their actions of 
detention were not authorised by domestic law. In order to legally detain under host 
domestic law, intervening states (like the United Kingdom) need to be careful to ensure 
their actions are authorised by legislation. While states may be more aware of this issue 
after Mohammed, ensuring that domestic legislation is created will continue to be a 
challenge in NIAC.  
 
Even if it is feasible to rely on domestic law, it is not necessarily desirable, especially when 
the benefits of IHL are compared with the drawbacks of domestic law. If domestic laws 
are implemented, they should be in accordance with the relevant state’s human rights 
obligations.  However, these obligations (unlike IHL) can be derogated from.215 If new 
domestic laws are implemented in NIAC, they may also create potential for future abuses 
(and easier deprivation of liberty),216 especially if the domestic process is rushed or 
altered.217 Els Debuf explains how authority to detain in IHL would avoid this issue:218 
 
  
211 Robert Kolb Advanced Introduction to International Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham, 2014) at 27.  
212 Rowe, above n 207, at 708; see also R (Application of Al-Saadoon) v Secretary of State for Defence [2010] 
2 LRC 1 at [33] per Laws LJ. 
213 Rowe, above n 207, at 708; see also Resolution on Iraq SC Res 1790 S/RES/1790 (2007).  
214 Rowe, above n 207, at 699. 
215 Sassoli and Olson, above n 68, at 626.  
216 See Moira Katherine Lynch “A Theory of Human Rights Accountability and Emergency Law: Bringing 
in Historical Institutionalism” (2015) 14 JHR 502; and Deeks, above n 1, at 403.  
217 See for example Deeks, above n 1, at 425.  
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If directly provided for in IHL, the legal basis to intern for reasons of military necessity 
will be available only in situations that indeed meet the threshold of armed conflict 
and be safer from abuse in situations that do not meet the threshold. 
 
Having different domestic detention regimes operating in conflict is also troublesome. 
Forces would be required to follow the IHL regime in IAC, and to apply a range of different 
regimes in NIAC, depending on location. Differing domestic regimes may also provide 
varying degrees of protection. In contrast, IHL is designed to be understood and applied by 
commanders from a variety of places and backgrounds,219 and endeavours to provide 
minimum standards of humanitarian protection,220 which may not be guaranteed in 
domestic law. Relying on domestic law for authority to detain in NIAC is therefore a 
problematic step backward and away from the minimum standards of humanitarian 
protection and clarity provided by IHL.221   
 
B Authority to Detain under UNSCRs 
 
Relying on UNSCRs to provide authority to detain is also complicated. Even if a UNSCR 
is promulgated regarding a specific conflict and appears to authorise detention, it may not 
guarantee the legality of such detention, if detention would otherwise breach an IHRL 
agreement. The Court in Mohammed decided the resolution in question (UNSCR 1890 of 
2009) did not provide authority to detain outside the scope of the ISAF policy,222 but that 
if it had, “…it is difficult to see why detention under the UN Charter and UNSCRs cannot 
also be a ground that is compatible with Article 5”.223 It is hard to determine exactly what 
this means. The Court made this statement when discussing the reasoning from Hassan, 
and the statement therefore implies that UNSCR obligations could be read into art 5 as 
  
219 Abresch, above n 106, at 743.  
220 Kolb, above n 211, at 27.  
221 Sandesh Sivakumaran The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
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222 Serdar Mohammed v Minister of Defence, above n 4, at [156] and [157].  
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another ground of detention, as IHL was in Hassan. This would be problematic, as, like the 
reasoning in Hassan, it would undermine art 5.224 The statement in Mohammed could 
instead mean that art 103 of the UN Charter would displace art 5, in so far as UNSCR 
obligations were incompatible with art 5, making detention legal if based on UNSCR 
obligations. This is the more logical and likely way that a court would deal with the 
interaction between IHRL and UNSCRs. Article 103 states:225 
 
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail. 
 
Like derogation, while this seems to provide a straightforward framework for interaction 
between different obligations, the reality is more complex. There has been debate about 
how UNSCRs are to be interpreted, and about the extent of clarity required before a conflict 
between obligations will be recognised. A relevant discussion of this issue occurred in Al-
Jedda (House of Lords).226 Hilal Al-Jedda, a British national, was detained in a British 
detention facility in Basra between 2004 and 2007, on the basis that his interment was 
“necessary for imperative reasons of security”.227 He was believed to have recruited 
terrorists, but was not facing charges or trial.228 The United Kingdom accepted that he was 
within ECHR jurisdiction,229 but argued that UNSCR 1546 authorised Al-Jedda’s detention 
by the MNF.230 The United Kingdom contended that, based on art 103, the UNSCR 
obligations must prevail over the ECHR obligations.231 Resolution 1546 (2004) states:232  
 
  
224 See discussion above at Part III. 
225 Charter of the United Nations 1 UNTS XVI (opened for signature 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 
October 1945), art 103.  
226 Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence, above n 102.  
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232 Resolution on Formation of a Sovereign Interim Government of Iraq SC RES 1546 S/RES/1546 (2004) 
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…the multinational force shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to 
contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the 
letters annexed to this resolution … 
 
One of the annexed letters referred to, from the United States Secretary of State, 
acknowledges that the MNF is ready to assist Iraq, and that it will undertake a number of 
things in order to maintain security, including “… internment where this is necessary for 
imperative reasons of security”.233 The House of Lords concluded that, under the UNSCR, 
the multinational force was obliged to “exercise its power of detention where this was 
necessary for imperative reasons of security”,234 and that art 103 meant this would not be 
a breach of the ECHR.  
 
The case came before the ECtHR, which found there was no conflict between ECHR 
obligations and the UNSCR, on the basis that when interpreting UNSCRs  “… there must 
be a presumption that the Security Council does not intend to impose any obligation on 
Member States to breach fundamental principles of human rights”.235 Although the 
annexed letters contemplated internment, the Court did not consider the wording indicated 
“unambiguously” that the Security Council intended to oblige the MNF to “… use 
measures of indefinite internment without charge and without judicial guarantees, in breach 
of their undertakings under international human rights instruments including the 
Convention”.236  This approach led to the majority’s conclusion that the provisions of art 5 
were not displaced, and that the detention constituted a violation of art 5(1).237 
 
Following Al-Jedda, the current ECtHR approach regarding art 103 is that clear and explicit 
language is required before a conflict between UNSCR obligations and ECHR obligations 
will be recognised. As mentioned, the Court of Appeal in Mohammed found that ISAF was 
  
233 Resolution on Formation of a Sovereign Interim Government of Iraq, above n 232, at annex.  
234 At [34] per Lord Bingham. 
235 Al-Jedda v United Kingdom, above n 13, at [102].  
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authorised to detain, but that Mohammed’s detention did not fall within that authorisation 
as the United Kingdom acted outside ISAF’s detention policy.238 When discussing art 103, 
the Court of Appeal referred only briefly to the ECtHR decision in Al-Jedda, and did not 
discuss why the ECtHR had found no conflict between the UNSCRs and ECHR.239 It then 
went on to state that, if the detention policy had been authorised by UNSCR 1890, it would 
have provided a ground for detention compatible with art 5.240 The reasoning in this section 
is particularly sparse, and would likely be subject to criticism if the case reaches higher 
courts. It fails to address the core issues surrounding the application of art 103, which are 
the reason behind the Al-Jedda requirement of unambiguous language. Another court 
would be likely to address the following core issues which the Court in Mohammed failed 
to address, and which support the argument that clear language should be required before 
a conflict between UNSCR and other obligations is found. 
 
Lord Bingham’s wide reading of art 103 in Al-Jedda was based on the UNSC’s role in 
maintaining international peace and security, the importance of which he thought “… can 
scarcely be exaggerated”.241 As well as being security-focused, this approach is practical 
and consistent with current UNSC practice. Aughey and Sari (when discussing the High 
Court Mohammed decision) argue that the phrase ‘all necessary measures’ is clear enough 
to “…satisfy the European Court’s requirement for explicit language”.242 To require 
anything more express “contradicts the consistent and well-established practice of the 
Council and the Member States of the UN in the interpretation and implementation of the 
Charter…”,243 and would require the impractical measure of the Security Council having 
to spell out all measures to be taken, in advance.244 
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However, the purpose of the United Nations also includes promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,245 and it has consistently reminded 
states that measures taken under UNSCRs should comply with IHRL obligations.246 The 
ECtHR approach in Al-Jedda is more positive in terms of human rights protection,247 and 
for that reason may be preferred by the ECtHR in future. The ECtHR has continued to 
follow a similar approach,248 as it found in Nada v Switzerland that there was no conflict 
between ECHR obligations and UNSCR obligations. That case concerned a much more 
specific UNSCR than Al-Jedda, but the ECtHR found the Swiss Government had failed to 
show that they attempted, as far as possible “to harmonise the obligations that they regarded 
as divergent”.249 This shows that the ECtHR will not be quick to find a conflict between 
ECHR and UNSCR obligations.  
 
Whether UNSCRs could be relied upon to authorise detention that is in conflict with IHRL 
is therefore not clear. While it is possible that a court may interpret phrases like ‘all 
necessary measures’ to include measures which breach fundamental rights, the reasoning 
in Al-Jedda (ECHR) tends towards the alternate conclusion that explicitly worded 
UNSCRs, to an extent that is not commonplace,250 will be required. If wording is not 
explicit, the ECtHR would likely continue, as it did in Al-Jedda and Nada, to find that art 
103 is not activated.  
  
245 Charter of the United Nations, above n 225, art 1(3); see also Misa Zgonec-Rozej “Al-Jedda v United 
Kingdom” (2012) 106 AJIL 830 at 835. 
246 See for example Resolution on Combatting Terrorism, SC Res 1426, S/RES/1426 (2003); see also Robert 
K Goldman “Extraterritorial Application of the Human Rights to Life and Personal Liberty, including Habeas 
Corpus, During Situations of Armed Conflict” in Robert Kolb and Gloria Gaggioli (eds) Research Handbook 
on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2013) 104 at 104. 
247 See Laura Henderson “With (Great) Power Comes (Great) Responsibility: A Move to Greater 
Responsibility for States Exercising Power Abroad” (2012) 28 Utrecht J Intl & Eur L 50 at 55. 
248 See Nada v Switzerland (2013) 56 EHRR 18 (Grand Chamber, ECHR); and Marjolein Busstra “The Thin 
Line Between Deference and Indifference: The Supreme Court of the Netherlands and the Iranian Sanctions 
Case” (2013) 44 NYIL 204. 
249 Busstra, above n 248, at 210.  
250 Erika de Wet “From Kadi to Nada: Judicial Techniques Favouring Human Rights over United Nations 
Security Council Sanctions” (2013) 12 Chinese JIL 787 at 806.  
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C Conclusion on Authority to Detain in NIAC 
 
While it is possible to find authority to detain in NIAC in both domestic law and UNSCRs, 
complete reliance on either source is troublesome. Domestic law is hard to change in NIAC, 
unlikely to already provide for foreign intervention, and less beneficial than IHL in many 
ways. UNSCRs may be more easily created in NIAC, but ECtHR jurisprudence thus far 
means they are unlikely to prevent detention from being illegal under the ECHR unless 
they are unusually specific in requiring violations of fundamental rights. The ruling in 
Mohammed has therefore identified (or some may say created) a concerning void in IHL; 
it would be preferable if authority to detain in NIAC could be found in IHL.  
 
VII  Future Developments Concerning Authority to Detain in NIAC 
 
Following the Court of Appeal’s decision in Mohammed, there is no consistently reliable 
source in which to find authority to detain in NIAC. However, critics of the decision in 
Mohammed can rest assured that the IHL of detention in NIAC is unlikely to remain 
stagnant, due to the prevailing discourse about the existence of authority to detain in NIAC 
in treaty law, and the development and implementation of soft law instruments which may 
impact the existence of such a power in CIL. Numerous commentators,251 and even the 
Court in Mohammed,252 believe, unsurprisingly, that it would be best for IHL to provide 
authority to detain in NIAC. Thus, this part of the paper will investigate the likelihood of 
change to the ruling in Mohammed, concerning authority to detain in NIAC. While it will 
demonstrate that change is likely in the near future, and will most likely be due to soft law 
developments, the paper will not speculate as to the exact details of such change, other to 
anticipate that change regarding authority to detain in NIAC will occur. Any other details 
are, as of yet, impossible to predict with certainty. 
A Whether Treaty Law Could Provide Authority to Detain in NIAC 
 
  
251 See for example Debuf, above n 1, at 449.  
252 Serdar Mohammed v Minister of Defence, above n 4, at [252].  
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As explained,253 the conclusion in Mohammed that there is no IHL authority to detain in 
NIAC was based on the Court’s finding that, first, there is no authority to detain in treaty 
law, and second, there is no authority to detain in CIL. Treaty law is less likely than CIL 
to develop in this area, but interpretation of the relevant treaties remains contentious and 
could change in future.  
 
The starting point for the discussion of treaty law in Mohammed was the absence, in the 
Geneva Conventions, of a rule allowing detention in NIAC.254 While the possibility of 
detention in NIAC is recognised by IHL (such as APII), IHL treaties do not provide express 
grounds and procedure for detention in NIAC.255 The United Kingdom Secretary of State 
therefore submitted in Mohammed that CA3 and APII mean there is implicit power to 
detain in situations those provisions apply to.256 It was argued that the requirement in CA3 
that persons detained shall be treated humanely,257 and the references in arts 2, 4(1), 5, and 
6 of APII, to those whose liberty has been deprived or restricted,258 mean there is implied 
authority to detain in NIAC.259 Proponents of this viewpoint argue that these provisions 
would be pointless if there was no power to detain in NIAC, while those who argue against 
it posit that regulation does not equal authorisation.260 In the same vein, Mohammed argued 
that CA3 and APII only describe minimum levels of treatment for detainees, but do not 
provide power to detain.261 Mohammed’s lawyers provided a table of 14 academic 
contributions which concluded that “authorisation to detain in a non-international armed 
conflict cannot be found in international humanitarian law …”.262 The Court agreed, and 
concluded the references mentioned above cannot create a power to detain, and that 
authority to detain had to be explicitly outlined. While in the past SS Lotus has been used 
  
253 See above at Part V.  
254 John B Bellinger III “Legal Issues Related to Armed Conflict with Non-State Groups” in Sibylle Scheipers 
(ed) Prisoners in War (Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) 251 at 251.  
255 See above at Part IID.    
256 At [74].  
257 Common Article 3, above n 59.  
258 Protocol II, above n 60.   
259 At [200].  
260 Serdar Mohammed v Minister of Defence, above n 4, at [175] and [180].  
261 At [175].  
262 At [241]. 
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to support the proposition that absence of prohibition equals authority,263 the Court in 
Mohammed considered SS Lotus to be outdated.264 Instead, the Court referred to Sir Robert 
Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts’ alternate explanation as accurate: states have a “large 
degree of freedom of action”, but that freedom must be derived from a legal right,“…not 
from an assertion of unlimited will”.265 Thus, a power to detain cannot be implied without 
more obvious evidence of authorisation.  
 
The Court prioritised this line of reasoning over the argument (referred to as the ‘a fortiori 
argument’) that the existence of an implied power to use force or kill in NIAC means there 
must be a corresponding power to detain.266 However, in doing so it acknowledged that 
there is a large body of existing literature on this issue, and that some commentators 
(including the ICRC) prefer the a fortiori argument and are, therefore, of the view that IHL 
treaties must contain an inherent power to detain. Pejic is one author who argues that GCIV 
provides for internment of civilians in a state party’s own territory and occupied territory, 
and sets out the procedure to be followed in both sets of circumstances.267  While it is more 
common for scholars to note the similarities between the IAC and NIAC regimes for 
detention,268 rather than going so far as saying the same grounds for detention apply in 
each, Pejic’s argument is a significant one. The existence of perspectives like hers and the 
strength of the a fortiori argument (which the Court referred to as “powerful”)269 means 
this may remain a contentious issue which could be open to change if re-evaluated by 
another court. There are, however, numerous barriers which may prevent a future court 
from altering the stance taken in Mohammed on these bases.  
 
  
263 SS Lotus (France v Turkey) (1927) PCIJ (series A) No 10 at 16 and 19. See also Mohammed at [97]. 
264 At [197].  
265 At [197]; see Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds) Oppenheim’s International Law (Longman 
Publishing, London, 1992) at 12; see also Christopher Staker “Jurisdiction” in Malcolm Evans (ed) 
International Law (4th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) 309 at 314; and James Crawford 
Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 40. 
266 At [207].  
267 Jelena Pejic “The European Court of Human Rights’ Al-Jedda Judgment: The Oversight of International 
Humanitarian Law” (2011) 92 IRRC 837 at 847.  
268 See Crawford, above n 57, at 79.  
269 Serdar Mohammed v Minister of Defence, above n 4, at [217].  
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First, although numerous scholars believe IHL treaties should or do contain authority to 
detain in NIAC, many are of the view that this alone may not make detention legal. For 
example, the Court in Mohammed referred to an ICRC opinion paper which states that the 
ICRC believes both customary and treaty IHL contain an inherent power to detain, but that 
this is not enough to make detention legal:270  
 
… in the absence of specific provisions in common Article 3 or Additional 
Protocol II, additional authority related to the grounds for internment and the 
process to be followed needs to be obtained, in keeping with the principle of 
legality. 
 
The principle of legality stems from domestic criminal law, but is also applied at an 
international law level.271 It requires that a crime or offence must be prescribed by law,272 
a requirement that would not be met if authority to detain in NIAC was implied. Further, a 
court is likely to be reluctant to imply a power which allows deprivation of liberty, as such 
a power usually constitutes a violation of human rights and is not necessarily provided in 
other instruments.273 For example, IHRL may provide rules for the procedure surrounding 
detention, but is unlikely to authorise or provide grounds for detention, as required by the 
principle of legality.  
 
Second, domestic courts in particular may be unwilling to make such a strong statement of 
law, considering states have chosen not to reform the relevant IHL treaties. The Court 
concluded its discussion in Mohammed by referring to Lord Hoffman’s decision in Jones 
  
270 International Committee of the Red Cross “Internment in Armed Conflict: Basic Rules and Challenges” 
(Opinion Paper, 2014) at 8 (emphasis added). See Serdar Mohammed v Minister of Defence, above n 4, at 
[202].  
271 See Kenneth S Gallant The Principle of Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010) at 352-403.  
272 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds) Customary International Humanitarian Law – 
Volume 1: Rules (International Committee of the Red Cross, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009), 
rule 101.  
273 Debuf, above n 1, at 6.  
   
52 
 
v Saudi Arabia, concerning the differences between judicial function “when considering a 
question of domestic law and when considering one of public international law”:274 
 
…It is not for a national court to ‘develop’ international law by unilaterally 
adopting a version of that law which, however desirable, forward-looking and 
reflective of values it may be, is simply not accepted by other states.  
 
Domestic courts may be disinclined to develop IHL unless the will of states to do so is 
clear.  In addition, the exact scope of a power would be difficult to determine, which is 
likely to make a court more reluctant to develop IHL. As the Court said in Mohammed, 
acknowledging an implied power from the treaty provisions mentioned above makes the 
scope of such a power incredibly hard to deduce,275 meaning courts may not wish to attempt 
to outline the scope – even though assistance can arguably be found in either IAC law of 
detention, or other areas of law.276 
 
Finally, new treaty law in this area seems an unlikely prospect, despite academic support. 
Almost all commentators who discuss detention in NIAC believe the best way to clarify 
this area of law would be for a new treaty to be made, or for the Geneva Conventions to be 
altered to specify that IHL does provide authority to detain in NIAC.277 However, this is 
unlikely to happen in the near future, even though the inadequacies of the Geneva 
Conventions have been acknowledged.278 When this area of law was discussed during both 
the Copenhagen Process and the ICRC Process, states were unwilling to formulate a 
  
274 Jones v Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26 [2007] 1 AC 270 at [63]. See Serdar Mohammed  v Minister of 
Defence, above n 4, at [253].  
275 At [207].  
276 At [218]. See also Crawford The Treatment of Combatants and Insurgents Under the Law of Armed 
Conflict (Oxford University Press, above n 57, at 125; and Debuf, above n 1, at 459.  
277 See for example Debuf, above n 1, at 497; and John B Bellinger III and Vijay M Padmanabhan “Detention 
Operations in Contemporary Conflicts: Four Challenges to the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law” 
(2011) 105 AJIL 201 at 220.  
278 See for example John Bellinger III “Legal Issues Related to Armed Conflict with Non-State Groups”, 
above n 254, at 251.  
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binding agreement.279 The ICRC has, as a result of its consultation process, concluded that 
while a treaty would be the most effective option, “…there appears to be a lack of sufficient 
political support for embarking on a treaty negotiation process at this stage”.280 Thus while 
there remains a chance that treaty law could be found to provide authority to detain in 
NIAC, this seems unlikely to occur in the near future.  
 
B Whether Customary International Law Could Provide Authority to Detain in NIAC 
 
The second key source examined in Mohammed was customary international law (CIL). It 
is well accepted, and was acknowledged by the Court in Mohammed,281 that in order for a 
rule to be CIL, there must be duration and consistency of state practice, generality of that 
practice, and opinio juris.282 The United Kingdom Secretary of State submitted that, if a 
power to detain in NIAC cannot be found in CA3 and APII, such a power can be found in 
CIL, based on the fact that states have consistently detained people in NIAC.283 Specific 
examples of state practice were provided, but the Court did not consider them 
convincing.284 The most relevant example given was of the detention practices of Australia, 
Canada, the Netherlands and the United States in Afghanistan. The Court considered that, 
because this practice was confined to a single conflict, it was not sufficiently extensive nor 
sufficiently uniform to constitute CIL, and did not “… provide unequivocal support” for 
  
279 See Jonathan Horowitz “Introductory Note to the Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines on the 
Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations” (2012) 51 ILM 1364 at 1366; Lawrence Hill-
Cawthorne “The Copenhagen Principles of the Handling of Detainees: Implications for the Procedural 
Regulation of Internment” (2013) 18 JCSL 481 at 482; and International Committee of the Red Cross 
Strengthening International Humanitarian law Protecting Persons Deprived of Liberty (Concluding Report, 
2015) [Concluding Report] at 4. 
280 International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 279.  
281 At [220].  
282 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark, Federal Republic of 
Germany v Netherlands) (Judgment) [1969] ICJ Rep 3 at 44. See also James Crawford, above n 265, at 24-
27.   
283 At [74].  
284 At [228]-[234]. 
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IHL authority to detain in NIAC.285 This led to the conclusion that there is no authority to 
detain in NIAC in CIL,286 an unsurprising result considering the evidence available.   
 
However, state practice is subject to change over time, and may be influenced by soft law 
instruments. The Court in Mohammed was careful to note that its ruling is specific to the 
“…present state of the development of international humanitarian law…”.287 IHL is an 
area that commonly involves multilateral processes, which can contribute to law-making if 
the instruments adopted are translated into CIL.288 In particular, soft law instruments “… 
may be evidence of existing law, or formative of the opinio juris or state practice that 
generates new law”.289  
 
1 The Copenhagen Principles 
 
The Copenhagen Principles constitute a soft law instrument relevant to detention in IHL, 
and were discussed in Mohammed. The Principles were the result of a process “…aimed at 
bringing major troop-contributing States together to discuss uncertainties surrounding the 
legal basis for detention … during international military operations not reaching the 
threshold of an international armed conflict”.290 As such they are directly relevant to cases 
like Mohammed and Hassan.291 Twenty four states were involved in the Copenhagen 
Process, as well as representatives from the African Union, European Union, North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, UN and ICRC,292 
 
  
285 At [230].  
286 At [242]  
287 At [242] (emphasis added).  
288 Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2007) at 210. For an opposing perspective on the utility of soft law see Jan Klabbers “The Undesirability of 
Soft Law” (1998) 67 Nordic JIL 381.  
289 Boyle and Chinkin, above n 288, at 118, 119, and 212.   
290 Jacques Hartman “The Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines” (2015) YIHL 3 at 5.  
291 Hill-Cawthorne, above n 279, at 483. “The Copenhagen Principles of the Handling of Detainees: 
Implications for the Procedural Regulation of Internment” (2013) 18 JCSL 481 at 483. 
292 Hill-Cawthorne, above n 279, at 482.   
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The substance of the Principles is comprised of rules regarding circumstances of detention, 
review of detention, and protection and release of detainees. The Principles were intended 
to reflect “generally accepted standards” of detention.293 Principle 16 is a savings clause 
which asserts that “…the Principles do not seek to create new legal obligations”.294 The 
Chairman’s Commentary to the Principles also explicitly states that the Principles 
“…cannot constitute a legal basis for detention”.295 However, the Principles explain when 
detention might occur, and on what basis: A person may be detained for:296  
 
… posing a threat to the security of military operations, for participating in 
hostilities, for belonging to an enemy organised armed group, for his or her 
own protection, or if the person is accused of committing a serious criminal 
offence. 
 
In Mohammed, the Secretary of State argued that the Copenhagen Principles are evidence 
of the state practice required to form CIL.297 However, the Court considered that Principle 
16 means “…if a customary international law basis is to be found for detention of SM, it 
must be found independently of and prior to the agreement of the Copenhagen Principles”, 
and that such evidence was not provided to the Court.298  While true that the Copenhagen 
Principles were not intended to restate CIL,299 the Principles have the potential to impact 
CIL in this area, long after the completion of the Copenhagen Process. The ways in which 
the Principles could contribute to international law are explained by Jacques Hartman:300  
  
293 Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations Chairman’s 
Commentary to the Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines (2012) [Chairman’s Commentary to the 
Copenhagen Principles], at 16.2.  
294 Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations Copenhagen 
Process: Principles and Guidelines (2012) [Copenhagen Principles] at preamble para II; see also Bruce 
‘Ossie’ Oswald “The Copenhagen Principles, Military Operations and Detentions” (2013) 17 Journal of 
International Peacekeeping 116 at 120.  
295 Chairman’s Commentary to the Copenhagen Principles, above n 293, at 16.2.  
296 Chairman’s Commentary to the Copenhagen Principles, above n 293, at 1.3.  
297 Serdar Mohammed v Minister of Defence, above n 4, at [224].  
298 At [227].  
299 Chairman’s Commentary to the Copenhagen Principles, above n 293, at 16.2  
300 Hartman, above n 290, at 25-26.  
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First, the adoption of non-binding texts is at times a significant step in the 
process of negotiating a legally binding agreement. In the case of the Principles 
and Guidelines, however, this prospect seems unlikely, as no further action has 
been taken after the conclusion of the Copenhagen Process. Second, non-
binding texts may also represent an agreed understanding of binding law, and 
in this specific case, of human rights of international humanitarian law… Third, 
the Principles and Guidelines may aid the development of customary 
international law.  
 
Regarding his third point, Hartman notes that, while the Commentary asserts the principles 
were not intended to be a restatement of CIL, this does not mean they never reflect state 
practice – he is of the view that some of the Principles are reflective of general practice.301  
Importantly, the Principles may also influence state behaviour to such an extent that new 
customary law could develop. As the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs (at the time of the 
Copenhagen Process) stated, use of the Principles to fill gaps in international law “…may 
in time become so prevalent in the international community, that certain principles, over 
time will be reflected as international customary law”.302 This is particularly likely as a 
number of troop-contributing states, likely to be involved in NIAC, supported the 
principles. Furthermore, this is an area in which little guidance is available, making the 
principles “…an invaluable resource”;303 they are “… an important source of the practice 
of a significant number of states with regard to detention in international military 
operations”.304 
 
  
301 Hartman, above n 290, at 25-26.  
302 Villy Søvndal, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Denmark) “The Copenhagen Process on Rules for Detainees 
in Military Operations” (Copenhagen, 19 December 2012).  
303 Hill-Cawthorne, above n 279, at 496.  
304 Hill-Cawthorne, above n 279, at 482.  
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Consequently, while the Court in Mohammed may have been correct to say the Copenhagen 
Principles do not currently represent CIL,305 it neglected to adequately foreshadow the fact 
that they may, in future, be the source of CIL in this area.  
2 The ICRC Process on Strengthening IHL Protecting Persons Deprived of Their Liberty 
 
Another soft law process which may impact the customary law of detention in NIAC is the 
ICRC Process.306  This consultation process came about as a result of expert identification 
of the absence of “detailed, universally applicable norms” regarding conditions of detention 
in NIAC.307 It included four regional consultations, two thematic consultations, one 
meeting open to all states, and reports and conclusions intended to facilitate state 
discussion.  The most recent outcome of this process is a Resolution adopted at the 32nd 
Conference of the ICRC (after the decision in Mohammed), which recommends further 
work in this area, and development of a non-legally binding outcome. The preamble 
acknowledges that detention is expected in armed conflict, and states that under IHL 
“States have, in all forms of armed conflict, both the power to detain, and the obligation to 
provide protection … for all persons deprived of their liberty…”.308  However, like the 
Copenhagen Principles, the Resolution endeavours to limit its own effect, as the preamble 
states “… this Resolution does not give rise to new legal obligations under international 
law”.309 Paragraph 8 provides the key action-point of the Resolution and recommends:310 
 
  
305 See on this Horowitz, above n 279, at 1366. 
306 See above at 10. 
307 International Committee of the Red Cross Strengthening International Humanitarian Law Protecting 
Persons Deprived of their Liberty: Synthesis Report from Regional Consultations of Government Experts 
(2013) [Synthesis Report] at 4.  
308 International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Resolution on Strengthening International 
Humanitarian Law Protecting Persons Deprived of Their Liberty 32IC/15/R1 (2015) [Resolution on 
Strengthening IHL] at preamble (emphasis added).  
309 At preamble.  
310 At para 8.  
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the pursuit of further in-depth work … with the goal of producing one or more 
concrete and implementable outcomes in any relevant or appropriate form of a 
non-legally binding nature … in particular in relation to NIAC. 
 
The progress made will be revisited at the 33rd International Conference.311 Therefore, 
there will eventually be a concrete outcome regarding this issue, although it is unclear what 
form that will take. Documents from the ICRC process can provide some insight as to what 
the outcome may include. There was debate among participants about whether IHL 
inherently (and currently) permits detention in NIAC. However, even states which did not 
believe IHL provides authority to detain “…expressed concern that the absence of any 
clearly expressed authorisation in treaty law was a gap that invited challenges … and that 
it would be useful to clarify its existence in an IHL instrument”.312 This indicates that the 
instrument developed will clarify the views of states regarding authority to detain. When 
grounds of detention were discussed, many states thought the best articulation of a ground 
for detention was “imperative reasons of security”, although it was agreed that the scope 
of this may require some clarification.313  
 
The product of the ICRC Process is likely to be more useful to states than the Copenhagen 
Principles, as the Process has been more extensive and inclusive. The regional 
consultations involved representatives from 93 states, while the thematic consultations on 
first, the conditions of detention and vulnerable detainee groups in NIAC, and second, the 
grounds and procedures for detention and detainee transfers in NIAC, involved experts 
from 37 states and 31 states respectively.314 112 state delegations attended the meeting for 
all states, in preparation for the 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent.315 The result of the process is, therefore, more likely to be reflective of general 
practice, and will be utilised by more states. The fact that the process is driven by the ICRC 
may also increase the likelihood of states implementing the outcome document or 
  
311 At para 13.  
312 International Committee of the Red Cross Synthesis Report, above n 307, at 14.  
313 International Committee of the Red Cross Synthesis Report, above n 307, at 14.  
314 International Committee of the Red Cross Concluding Report, above n 279, at 2-3.  
315 International Committee of the Red Cross Concluding Report, above n 279, at 3. 
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principles, as the ICRC has long been recognised as a major driving force behind IHL 
development.316 Furthermore, the Copenhagen Principles have been criticised by both 
human rights groups and scholars, who have argued the Principles are not strict enough 
and do not sufficiently protect human rights.317 It is possible that the ICRC may be better 
able to avoid these criticisms, due in part to its own participation (part of the Red Cross 
mandate is to protect and assist victims of armed conflict),318 and also to the benefit of 
hindsight; the criticisms of the Copenhagen Principles can be taken into account when a 
new instrument is formulated.  
 
A number of factors will be relevant to whether the outcome could, over time, come to be 
viewed as CIL. These include the circumstances of the adoption of the instrument (such as 
voting patterns and the existence of reservations), the clarity of language used, and the 
existence of follow up procedures.319 It is hard to speculate as to how these aspects might 
play out, but the ICRC’s history of participation in IHL processes increases the likelihood 
of factors like clear language and follow up processes. Compliance is also of obvious 
importance in terms of creating state practice and opinio juris. Compliance is more likely 
to occur when a norm is particularly strong,320 when institutional arrangements are in place 
to support a norm via information-exchange, monitoring, and verification of compliance,321 
and where “… international cooperation can overcome collective action problems 
  
316 Françoise Bugnion “The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Development of International 
Humanitarian Law” (2005) 5 CJIL 191 at 192; see also Knut Dörmann and Louis Maresca “The International 
Committee of the Red Cross and Its Contribution to the Development of International Humanitarian Law in 
Specialised Instruments” (2005) 5 CJIL 217 at 219 and 225. 
317 Hill-Cawthorne, above n 279, at 497; see also Hartman, above n 290, at 18.  
318 Dörmann and Maresca, above n 316, at 213.  
319 See Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, above n 65, at 255-256; see also Christine Chinkin 
“Normative Development in the International Legal System” in Dinah Sheldon (ed) Commitment and 
Compliance The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2000) 21 at 32.  
320 Abram Chayes and Dinah Shelton “Commentary” in Dinah Sheldon (ed) Commitment and Compliance 
The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 
521 at 527.  
321 Chayes and Shelton, above n 320, at 529.  
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involving uncertain or changing risks”.322 In this instance, states evidently recognise the 
lack of clarity in this area of law, and wish to remedy it.323 Thus, if a strong norm regarding 
detention in NIAC can be developed, it is in the interests of states to follow it, as it will 
likely be the clearest and most obvious option available in this area of law. While states do 
not have an interest in providing legal protection to members of non-state armed groups, 
their own desire to ensure the legal detention of members of armed groups (like 
Mohammed), may take priority: In response to the Mohammed decision, the United 
Kingdom Minister for the Armed Forces stated “The notion that dangerous insurgents 
cannot be detained for more than a few hours is ludicrous”.324 For these reasons, the ICRC 
Process outcome will be more appealing to states than the Copenhagen Principles, and is 
more likely to eventually develop into CIL.  
 
3 United Nations Principles and Guidelines  
 
A third soft-law instrument relevant to detention in NIAC is the United Nations Principles 
and Guidelines on the Right of Anyone Deprived of Their Liberty to Bring Proceedings 
Before a Court (The UN Guidelines). These were formulated by the UN Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention, at the request of the Human Rights Council,325 which wanted the 
principles to “…aim at assisting Member States in fulfilling their obligations to avoid 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty and to comply with international human rights law”.326 
Unlike the Copenhagen Principles and ICRC Process, the UN Guidelines are not specific 
  
322 Chayes and Shelton, above n 320, at 531; see also Edith Brown Weiss “Conclusions: Understanding 
Compliance with Soft Law” in Dinah Sheldon (ed) Commitment and Compliance The Role of Non-Binding 
Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000)  535 at 537. 
323 International Committee of the Red Cross Synthesis Report, above n 307, at 3.  
324 Ministry of Defence (UK) “Breaking News: MOD Response to Court of Appeal Judgment”, above n 8. 
325 UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: United 
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Proceedings Before a Court WGAD/CRP.1/2015 (2015) [Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention] at summary; see also International Commission of Jurists “ICL Legal Commentary on the Right 
to Challenge the Lawfulness of Detention in Armed Conflict” (14 September 2015) <www.icj.org>.  
326 Human Rights Council Arbitrary Detention A/HRC/20/L.5 (29 June 2012) at [10].  
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to situations of conflict, and apply to any situation where there is a deprivation of liberty.327 
However, Principle 16 is specific to conflict, and specifies that all persons detain in armed 
conflict “… are guaranteed the exercise of the right to bring proceedings before a court to 
challenge the arbitrariness and lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty…”.328 Regarding 
grounds of detention, Principle 16 states:329 
 
Administrative detention or internment in the context of a non-international armed 
conflict may only be permitted in times of public emergency threatening the life of the 
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed.  
 
This indicates that the Working Group does not believe that IHL provides authority to 
detain in NIAC.330 However, although this may be the view of some states, the ICRC 
process is still likely to result in a different outcome. The UN Guidelines are human rights 
focused, and do not adequately account for the realities of armed conflict. They impose 
higher standards than IHL,331 by requiring that those deprived of liberty must be able to 
bring their case before a court that “…shall be established by law and bear the full 
characteristics of a competent, independent and impartial judicial authority…”.332This 
higher standard is possibly due to the fact that the Working Group drew these principles 
from “…recognised good practice”,333 as opposed to the “generally accepted practice” 
which was the basis of the Copenhagen Principles;334 the Working Group principles are 
  
327 UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, above 
n 325, at 1.1.  
328 UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, above 
n 325, at [45].  
329 UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, above 
n 325, at [49].  
330 Marco Milanovic “UN Working Group in Arbitrary Detention Adopts Principles and Guidelines on 
Habeas Corpus” (5 May 2015) <www.ejiltalk.org>. 
331 Milanovic “UN Working Group in Arbitrary Detention Adopts Principles and Guidelines on Habeas 
Corpus”, above n 330.  
332 UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, above 
n 325, at [27]. 
333 UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, above 
n 325, at summary.  
334 Chairman’s Commentary to the Copenhagen Principles, above n 93, at 16.2. 
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more reflective of ideal practice, while the Copenhagen Principles are more akin to how 
states actually act. The fact that the UN Guidelines are not armed conflict specific, and do 
not acknowledge the unique requirements of armed conflict mean they are less likely, in 
comparison to the Copenhagen Principles and ICRC Process, to be followed by states 
looking for guidance regarding detention in NIAC.  
C Conclusion on Future Developments 
 
This part has demonstrated that the finding in Mohammed that there is no IHL authority to 
detain in NIAC is highly unlikely to remain static in future. The possibility of a finding that 
there is authority to detain in treaty law is plausible, but much less likely than the 
development of such an authority in CIL. As states desire clarity regarding the legality of 
detention, but remain unwilling to formulate a binding treaty, instruments like the 
Copenhagen Principles and the outcome of the ICRC process are the obvious place to look 
for guidance. While authors like Jan Klabbers criticise reliance on soft-law, it is likely to 
be the only way in which the legal questions of states (regarding detention in NIAC) will 
be answered any time soon.335 The characteristics of the ICRC Process point to the 
conclusion that the law in this area will eventually change to provide authority for detention 
in NIAC. Further, it should be noted that soft law developments can often lead to treaties, 
as the risk-free creation of soft law instruments can “…generate the political will, originally 
absent, for entering into legally binding agreements”.336 Finally, and to reiterate, the law 
regarding authority to detain in NIAC is important regardless of whether the approach in 
Hassan is taken, or whether a derogation is entered under the ECHR. It will, therefore, 
remain important for states and scholars to keep a watchful eye on the developments in this 
area, as change is likely.  
 
VIII Conclusion 
 
  
335 See Klabbers, above n 288, at 381.  
336 Chayes and Shelton, above n 320, at 533.  
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This paper has identified the key issues raised by Hassan and Mohammed, and 
demonstrated that, while these cases bring a number of issues concerning IHL to the fore, 
there are preferable options available which will lead to less problematic outcomes. First, 
the reasoning in Hassan led to an inappropriate amendment to the ECHR, and its implicit 
acceptance in Mohammed is thus a cause for concern. The fact that the ECtHR has amended 
the ECHR in a way that clearly contradicts the wording of the Convention is particularly 
troubling. Requiring derogation under the ECHR, instead of following the reasoning in 
Hassan, is both a plausible and preferable option, which allows for detention in armed 
conflict but also provides human rights protection. If a court were to take this step it would 
be traversing new ground in ECHR jurisprudence, but in a much more positive way than 
was done in Hassan.   
 
The second key issue, stemming from the Mohammed case, is the Court of Appeal’s 
conclusion that there is no authority to detain in NIAC. This reasoning results in a void in 
IHL, and means detention may not be legal in some circumstances where it would be both 
practical and human rights friendly (as an alternative to killing). Reliance on domestic law 
to detain is flawed in an armed conflict situation, and reliance on UNSCRs is not 
guaranteed to be legal – unless the UNSC is unusually specific in requiring violations of 
human rights. However, hope is provided in the form of the soft law instruments operating 
in this area, in particular, the Copenhagen Principles and ICRC Process. These are more 
likely than treaty law or interpretation to bring requisite change, and to eventually create 
customary law IHL authority to detain in NIAC.  
 
At the heart of this issue and this paper is the delicate balance that must be struck between 
the need to detain in armed conflict, and the need to protect human rights. While these 
cases have not quite reached that balance, discussion of the interaction between the ECHR 
and IHRL in new forums is beneficial for general awareness and knowledge of both 
branches of law, and for those who wish to bring IHL related claims.337 These beneficial 
effects are diminished by the numerous problems, identified in this paper, in the 
  
337 Byron, above n 75, at 895. 
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Mohammed and Hassan decisions.338 There are, however, options available to remedy the 
defects of these cases. It is reasonable to hope that this area of law will improve for both 
states and detainees, in the relatively near future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IX Appendix: Relevant Provisions  
 
A European Convention on Human Rights  
 
Article 5(1): 
 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:  
 
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;  
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for noncompliance with the lawful order of a 
court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; 8 9  
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before 
the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or 
  
338 See Cordula Droege “The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict” (2007) 40 Isr L Rev 310 at 351. 
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when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing 
after having done so;  
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or 
his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; 
 (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious 
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;  
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry 
into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to 
deportation or extradition. 
 
Article 15: 
 
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High 
Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention 
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures 
are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.  
 
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of 
war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision.  
 
3. Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has 
taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention 
are again being fully executed. 
 
B International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
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Article 4: 
 
1 . In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of 
which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take 
measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent 
with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely 
on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. 
 
2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made 
under this provision. 
 
3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of derogation shall 
immediately inform the other States Parties to the present Covenant, through the 
intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of the provisions from which 
it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated. A further communication shall 
be made, through the same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such 
derogation. 
 
Article 9: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds 
and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. 
 
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his 
arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him. 
 
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a 
judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to 
trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons 
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awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to guarantees to 
appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, 
for execution of the judgement. 
 
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the 
lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful. 
 
5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable 
right to compensation. 
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